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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 9th, 2007, while clothed in his trademark long-sleeved black
turtleneck, jeans, and tennis shoes, the keynote speaker at the Macworld
2007 Convention, Steve Jobs, addressed an enraptured San Francisco crowd
of journalists, techies, lay observers and industry insiders. Jobs began his
nearly one-and-a-half-hour-long sermon by saluting the revolutionary
technology that Apple had produced over the prior two decades, particularly
the Macintosh computer and the iPod. Jobs boasted to the assembled crowd
that the Macintosh and the iPod not only changed Apple but also upended
the entire computer and music industries. Jobs then introduced the iPhone;1
a technology that like its Apple predecessors, has completely revolutionized
its respective industry.2
A year later on July 10th, 2008, Apple’s App Store was opened, once
again allowing Apple to transform not only the technology landscape but
also American and international culture at large.3 Indeed, the App store,
which currently houses over 1.8 million apps,4 has not only created millions
1. See Protectstar Inc., iPhone 1 – Steve Jobs MacWorld Keynote in 2007 – Full
Presentation, 80 mins, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQK
MoT-6XSg [https://perma.cc/6QEX-7BFL] for Steve Jobs’ 2007 keynote speech.
2. To this day nearly 50% of smartphone users in the United States are iPhone owners.
See S. O’Dea, Share of Smartphone Users That Use an Apple iPhone in the United States
from 2014 to 2021, STATISTA (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/236550/pe
rcentage-of-us-population-that-own-a-iphone-smartphone/ [https://perma.cc/6ZWP-2Q5H]
(exhibiting that in the year 2021 45.4% of smartphone users are iPhone owners).
3. The App Store Turns 10, APPLE (July 5, 2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2
018/07/app-store-turns-10/#:~:text=When%20Apple%20introduced%20the%20App,travel
%20and%20so%20much%20more [https://perma.cc/NN4X-SAU5].
4. J. Clement,Number of Apps Available in Leading App Stores as of 2nd Quarter 2020,
STATISTA (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-a
vailable-in-leading-app-stores/ [https://perma.cc/XPS9-LPZL].
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of jobs5 and generated half a trillion dollars in commerce during 2019,6 but
has clearly become a welcomed and universal presence within our collective
daily lives. Yet, despite the seeming acceptance of the App Store by the
general public, much criticism has been levied against Apple. In particular,
Apple’s detractors maintain that, notwithstanding the output-increasing
impact of Apple’s mobile ecosystem on the national and world economy,
Apple has misused its monopoly on distribution of third-party apps for the
system. This criticism came to a head in 2019 when the Supreme Court
addressed whether App Store customers had standing to sue for Apple’s
alleged violations of federal antitrust laws.
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that
the class of plaintiffs who purchased apps on the Apple App Store has
standing as direct purchasers to pursue antitrust claims against Apple.7 The
decision was praised by some, particularly in the plaintiffs’ bar, as a logical
continuation of Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence.8 Conversely, the
Court’s ruling was derided by many within the business community as a
dangerous and unmerited extension of antitrust standing.9 Ironically, as the
late Justice Ginsburg commented at oral argument, under current Supreme
Court case law, Apple could have entirely avoided this litigation and been
“home free” if it had adopted an arbitration clause with a class action waiver
5. iOS App Economy Creates 300,000 New US Jobs as Developers Adapt During
Pandemic, APPLE NEWSROOM (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/09/io
s-app-economy-creates-300000-new-us-jobs-as-developers-adapt-during-pandemic/ [https://
perma.cc/S68L-ZE4L].
6. Nick Statt, Apple Says the App Store Created $519 Billion in Commerce Last Year,
THEVERGE (June 15, 2020, 6:34 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/15/21292203/apple
-app-store-ios-apps-billings-revenue-517-billion-2019-antitrust-regulation [https://perma.cc/
CE55-D24W].
7. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1515 (2019) (holding that iPhone owners are
direct purchasers under Illinois Brick).
8. See Greg Stohr, Apple Must Face iPhone App Antitrust Suit, Supreme Court Rules,
BLOOMBERGNEWS (May 13, 2019, 10:06 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2
019-05-13/apple-loses-at-u-s-supreme-court-on-iphone-app-antitrust-suit [https://perma.cc/T
2MK-N5N4] (describing how one of the lawyers called the ruling “a major victory for
consumers”);Mathew Hans and Phillip Zeeck, Apple v. Pepper—A Straightforward Decision
Raising Complicated Issues, AMERICANBARASS’N (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.americanb
ar.org/groups/litigation/committees/trial-evidence/articles/2019/apple-pepper-complicated-is
sues/ [https://perma.cc/HVA6-5FVF] (stating that the five-justice majority applied the direct
purchaser rule in a straightforward fashion).
9. See Tony Romm and Reed Albergotti, Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Sends Antitrust
Shock Waves Through Silicon Valley, WASH. POST (May 13, 2019, 6:36 PM), https://www.w
ashingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/13/apples-supreme-court-loss-sends-antitrust-shock
waves-through-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/RG8C-QA4A] (commenting that the
decision has “unsettled” and sent “shock waves” throughout the tech industry).
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in its terms of use.10 Indeed, while much ink has been spilt over the
significance of the Pepper decision, its import and impact will likely be
minimal. Given the increasing use of arbitration clauses as well as class
action waivers within many markets in the modern digital economy, judicial
decisions with fact patterns akin to Pepper may become a rarity.
The rising use of mandatory arbitration clauses and class action
waivers, sanctioned by Supreme Court precedent and enthusiastically
endorsed by much of the business community, will bar many potential
plaintiffs from the ability to assert antitrust violations in the courts.
Moreover, as explained in this case note, another paradox of the potential
limited application of Pepper is that while the plaintiffs in Pepper were
found to have standing to proceed in the absence of an arbitration clause in
Apple’s terms of use, only indirect purchasers might be permitted to pursue
antitrust claims against companies that adopt arbitration clauses with class
action waivers under state repealer statutes that were enacted in the wake of
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.11 Consequently, defendants that have inserted
mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers in their terms of use
will effectively bar direct purchasers from pursuing direct antitrust claims in
the courts as well as on a class-wide basis.12 This inflexible outcome directly
contradicts what the Supreme Court sought to accomplish in Illinois Brick
(wherein it expressly limited federal antitrust standing to direct purchasers).
Indeed, when the Pepper case was first filed in the Northern District of
California over a decade ago, AT&T was, along with Apple, named as a
defendant.13 However, after the Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion14 that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws
prohibiting contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration, the district
court compelled arbitration, and AT&T was ultimately dismissed from the
10. See infra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
11. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect purchasers
were not injured by the antitrust violation and therefore may not sue for damages). See also
OFF.OF THEATT’YGEN. STATEOFCONN., TESTIMONYOFATTORNEYGENERALGEORGE JEPSEN
BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 4 (2018), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/JUDdata/Tm
y/2018HB-05252-R000309-Jepsen,%20George,%20Office%20of%20Attorney%20General-
TMY.PDF [https://perma.cc/7STR-4E6B] (listing the states that have enacted repealer
statutes subsequent to the Illinois Brick ruling).
12. See infra Part VI (discussing the implications, or lack thereof, of the Court’s decision
in Apple v. Pepper).
13. In Re Apple & AT&T & TMAntitrust Litig., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(denying AT&T’s motion to dismiss; granting in part and denying in part Apple’s motion to
dismiss).
14. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011) (reversing the
Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision and holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state
law that prohibits contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration).
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action.15 In the wake of the paradigm shifting Concepcion decision, many
tech companies rushed to adopt mandatory arbitration clauses with class
action waivers — if they were not already in place.16 Unusually, Apple did
not follow suit and continues to employ a standard choice of venue provision,
requiring all users of its iTunes store to litigate any dispute in the courts of
California.17
As commerce becomes more digitized and companies such as Amazon,
Facebook andMicrosoft dominate market share in their respective industries,
direct purchasers of their products will continue to procure their goods and
services online after agreeing to terms of service (containing arbitration
clauses with class action waivers) via the simple click of a mouse. Given
this, the importance of cases like Pepper and even Illinois Brick, will
diminish if direct purchasers are denied access to the courts to pursue
individual antitrust claims – let alone on a class-wide basis. Instead, those
direct purchasers will be increasingly relegated to secretive arbitration
tribunals wherein they will only be allowed to assert individual claims “with
no effective means of review.”18 Accordingly, it is probable that fewer
private antitrust actions will be filed, and direct purchasers will have to either
rely on governmental antitrust authorities to enforce their antitrust claims or
be relegated to pursue individual claims in arbitration.
Yet, recent data submitted to Congress demonstrates that few
consumers avail themselves of their individual arbitration rights.19 This
likely means that only well-resourced plaintiffs whose mere end goal is the
pursuit of martyrdom upon the altar of the Illinois Brick doctrine will file
15. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-cv-06714-YGR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116245, at *51 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013).
16. Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 853
(2012) (noting that “all the clauses I examined contained class action waivers . . . nearly all
the clauses had been amended in the aftermath of Concepcion. Indeed, I could find few
arbitration clauses that hadn’t been amended in 2011-2012”).
17. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/i
nternet-services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/3ENA-HC5C] (last updated Sept. 16,
2020) (“You and Apple agree to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
located within the county of Santa Clara, California, to resolve any dispute or claim arising
from this Agreement.”).
18. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia partially
justified the Court’s disallowance of mandatory class arbitration premised on the lack of
“effective means of review” when the same is true of the arbitration of individual claims.
19. See David Dayen, Tech Companies’ Big Reveal: Hardly Anyone Files Arbitration
Claims, THEAMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 26, 2019), https://prospect.org/power/tech-compani
es-hardly-anyone-files-arbitration-claims/ [https://perma.cc/GTU5-G6NF] (indicating that
forced arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts build barriers to disputing
the conduct of large companies).
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individual claims via the opaque avenue of arbitration; or to paraphrase
Judge Richard Posner, only a lunatic or a fanatic would pursue such claims
on an individual basis.20
The ultimate purpose of this case note is to analyze and assess whether
Pepper will have the impact that many predicted. However, prior to any
evaluation of Pepper, I will first briefly define the statutory basis for antitrust
suits, particularly as it pertains to direct and indirect purchaser standing. I
will then review the Supreme Court jurisprudence that led to the
development of the Indirect Purchaser Rule as well as its ultimate impact.
Subsequently, I will discuss Pepper, its decade-long journey through the
federal courts, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the competing
interests surrounding the case, the oral argument before the Supreme Court,
as well as the ultimate decision penned by Justice Kavanaugh. Lastly, I will
endeavor to evaluate, given the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
addressing the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses, whether the
impact of Pepper will be mitigated by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses with class action waivers.
II. ANTITRUST STANDING: DIRECT AND INDIRECT PURCHASERS
As stated by the Court in Pepper: “A claim that a monopolistic retailer
(here, Apple) has used its monopoly to overcharge consumers is a classic
antitrust claim.”21 In order to assert standing in a direct purchaser action, a
plaintiff must first allege that there has been a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which provides in relevant part that “[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony. . . .”22 A plaintiff may then utilize Section 4 of
20. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that
“only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”); see also Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 785
F.3d 1157, 1160 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that it would not be worthwhile for the plaintiffs to
pursue their claim via arbitration because even if they prevail they “will be entitled only to
modest statutory damages”); see, e.g., Richard D. Freer, SCOTUS Analysis: Lamps Plus Inc.
v. Varela, EMORY L. NEWSCTR. (July 17, 2019), http://law.emory.edu/news-and-events/relea
ses/2019/07/2019-07-17-SCOTUS-Freer-Lamps-Plus-v-Varela.html [https://perma.cc/R2E3
-LLF4] (noting that “no one but a zealot or a nut (to paraphrase Judge Posner) will go through
arbitration for a return of $30, a requirement that claimants proceed alone may ensure that
very few claims will be pursued, even if well-grounded in law and fact”).
21. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019).
22. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890). The Courts have applied a rule of reason to
Section 2 claims. The mere existence of a monopoly is not, by itself, a violation of Section
2. A monopoly is only illegal if it unreasonably restrains trade through exclusionary conduct.
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the Clayton Act, which provides a private right of action to “any person who
shall be injured in his business or property” to enforce the antitrust laws and
sue the alleged violator.23
Despite the broad language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, federal
courts have long been wary of granting standing to every potential plaintiff
injured by an antitrust violation for fear of allowing a plaintiff whose injury
is “too remote” to pursue claims.24 Because such remote or indirect
purchasers did not directly purchase from the antitrust violator, federal courts
have reasoned that the mountain they must climb to prove their claim is too
steep, and therefore indirect purchasers should be barred from asserting any
claim.25 Instead, such courts have often applied the common law principle
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (stating that “most antitrust claims are
analyzed under a ‘rule of reason,’ according to which the finder of fact must decide whether
the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account
a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect”).
23. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1914). The section reads in relevant part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.
24. Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912,
917 (3d Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim by stating that injuries that they allegedly
suffered from defendants’ wrongdoing are simply too remote from that wrongdoing to be
cognizable under the antitrust laws); see generally Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.
v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (denoting that the remote and
obviously speculative character of the alleged harm is plainly sufficient to place it beyond the
reach of Section 4); Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v. Barclays Am./Commercial Inc., 919
F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the injury suffered by Mr. Furniture was remote and
not the type of injury that Congress was likely to be concerned with and therefore provided a
private remedy under Section 4); Kloth v. Microsoft Corp. 444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that as indirect purchasers with remote injuries, the plaintiffs could not sue the
manufacturer because they lacked standing); In Re Antitrust Zinc Litigation, 155 F.Supp.3d
337, 365 (S.D.N.Y 2016) (stating that Plaintiffs are “simply too remote from that market to
have antitrust standing”). But see Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)
(holding that McCready’s loss was not too remote or indirect to pursue a remedy under
Section 4).
25. See Steamfitters Local Union, 171 F.3d 912 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims because
the harm was too remote); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. 519 (finding
plaintiffs’ allegations of harm insufficient due to its indirectness);Mr. Furniture Warehouse,
919 F.2d 1517 (holding that Mr. Furniture did not have antitrust standing because his injury
was too remote, and not the kind that Congress intended to forestall); Kloth, 444 F.3d 312
(holding that plaintiffs’ claims of injuries were indirect and too remote to give them standing);
In Re Antitrust Zinc Litigation, 155 F.Supp.3d 337 (“[P]laintiffs are simply too remote from
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of proximate cause in order to bar potential plaintiffs from bringing suit.26
This has resulted in much inconsistency and confusion in antitrust standing
jurisprudence27 and has led to decisions that run counter to one of the main
goals of antitrust law – namely, “to protect the process of competition for the
benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses
to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keeping quality up.”28
Furthermore, as an illegal overcharge is commonly passed through a
distribution chain to multiple consumers or purchasers, many consumers and
purchasers along the stream of commerce are often injured by a single
overcharge.29 For instance, when a price-fixing manufacturer overcharges
for the goods that it sells, the consumer who purchases the goods directly
from the price-fixing manufacturer is the first consumer that is injured by the
overcharge.30 This “direct purchaser” may then incorporate the price-fixed
good into the products it sells and thereby pass on all or some portion of the
price-fixing manufacturer’s overcharge to its distributors. The distributors
subsequently pass on all or part of that overcharge to consumers further down
the stream of commerce. As neither the distributors nor the consumers
further down the stream of commerce purchased the goods directly from the
price-fixing manufacturer, they are not considered “direct purchasers” for
purposes of antitrust standing, but rather are adjudged as “indirect
purchasers” because their injury is deemed to be too remote to allow for
that market to have antitrust standing. . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se
Standard, 93 YALE L. J. 1309, 1310 (1984) (arguing that the application of tort analysis to
questions of standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act has stemmed from a failure to
recognize the nature of the per se standard in antitrust law). This is essentially the argument
made by the dissenters in Pepper: “The Court today risks replacing a cogent rule about
proximate cause with a pointless and easily evaded imposter.” Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1530.
27. Richman, supra note 26 (arguing that courts’ use of the common law principle of
proximate cause in antitrust cases has produced inconsistent results and therefore led to much
confusion in standing case law).
28. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADECOMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-/advice/competit
ion-guIdance/guIde-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/Y848-6EE4] (last visited
Sept. 4, 2020) (summarizing the core federal antitrust laws and stating Congress’ objective
when passing these laws).
29. See Ryan M. Sandrock, Apple v. Pepper and the Future of the Direct Purchaser
Enforcement Regime, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUSTMAGAZINE 6, 7 (2019) (delineating how a single
illegal overcharge may injure a multitude of consumers further down the stream of
commerce).
30. ANTITRUSTMODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), htt
ps://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/MFR8-RZUD] (hereinafter “AMC Report”) (recommending that Congress overrule the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe to the extent necessary to
permit both direct and indirect purchasers to recover for their respective injuries).
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recovery.31 This has come to be known as the Indirect Purchaser Rule, also
colloquially known as the Illinois Brick Doctrine.
The Indirect Purchaser Rule, is actually the consequence of both Illinois
Brick as well as its predecessor case, Hanover Shoe, decided a decade
earlier.32 In Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court allowed a direct purchaser to
fully recover for an illegal overcharge irrespective of whether the direct
purchaser ultimately “passed on” none, some, or the entire overcharge to
consumers further down the stream of commerce.33 In Illinois Brick, the
Supreme Court denied standing to downstream consumers, ultimately
reasoning that they were indirect purchasers regardless of whether or not the
overcharge had been “passed on” to them.34 The Court held that the
first/direct purchaser may receive the entirety of the defendant’s overcharge
in damages and those damages are not reduced by the amount of the
overcharge that the direct purchaser passed on to subsequent purchasers
further down the stream of commerce.35 Therefore, indirect purchasers may
not lay claim to any damages as they have already been recovered via the
direct purchaser.36 Understanding the reasoning behind these two cases as
well as the genesis of the Illinois Brick Doctrine that emanated from the
Court’s decisions is crucial to understanding Pepper.
III. THEDEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASERRULE
A. Hanover Shoe – A look at the notion of the “Pass-on” in Supreme
Court Antitrust Jurisprudence
Prior to Hanover Shoe the Supreme Court addressed, albeit in dicta,
31. Id. To be clear, Illinois Brick does not apply to suits by indirect purchasers seeking
injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Sherman Act because such suits do not raise the same
concerns about duplicative recovery or the apportionment of damages. See Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1986) (“Thus, because standing under § 16
raises no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, some of the factors other than
antitrust injury that are appropriate to a determination of standing under § 4 are not relevant
under § 16.”).
32. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (holding that
United Shoe violated the Sherman Act through its illegal monopolization of the shoe machine
industry); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
33. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 482.
34. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see alsoHerbert Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’s Indirect
Purchaser Rule, 120 COLUM. L. REV. FORUM 14, 15 (2020) (stating that “indirect purchasers
would not be able to claim any damages, since they had already been recovered in full by the
direct purchaser”).
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direct purchaser claims and the notion of the pass-on in just one case.37 In
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.,38 the Court held that the plaintiff,
a manufacturer of excelsior and flax tow out of Minnesota that had alleged
that the defendant corporations (eight interstate railroad companies) had
conspired to fix freight rates, lacked a valid cause of action under the
Sherman Act as “not only does the injury complained of rest on hypothesis
(citation omitted); but the damages alleged are purely speculative.”39
Additionally, in what is the first allusion to the pass-on concept in Supreme
Court antitrust jurisprudence, the Court further reasoned that because the
challenge was to a legally sanctioned rate, “no court or jury could say that,
if the rate had been lower, Keogh would have enjoyed the difference between
the rates or that any other advantage would have accrued to him. The benefit
might have gone to his customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer
(emphasis added).”40 For the ensuing forty-six years, until Hanover Shoe,
the Court did not grant certiorari to any case which concerned either direct
purchasers or pass-ons.
In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff brought a private action against United
Shoe Machinery Corporation (“United Shoe”), a distributor of shoemaking
37. There were a number of “passing-on” cases litigated in several Circuit Courts,
particularly the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, prior to the Hanover decision. See Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941) (holding that an increase in the price of
gasoline to plaintiff was not immediately reflected in a corresponding increase in the retailers’
price during the years in question, and therefore, there was no loss in margins, nor in the sale
of plaintiff’s property that could be attributed to the alleged “buying program”); Nw. Oil Co.
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943) (deciding that plaintiff has wholly
failed to prove any loss to its property or business but rather has shown, by all reasonable
inferences, that the increased cost of which it complained was passed on to the ultimate
consumer and therefore the district court rightfully directed a verdict for defendant); Clark
Oil Co. v. Phillips PetroleumCo., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945) (holding that plaintiff’s alleged
damages are neither logically nor legally inferable, but rather are merely supplied via
conjecture); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F. 2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949)
(concluding that plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of proving that defendants have
caused them to sustain pecuniary damages); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F. 2d 427 (9th
Cir. 1955) (finding that after an inquiry into the relevant facts that plaintiff’s contention that
they could not possibly pass on increased costs to their customers is unconvincing); Beacon
Fruit Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 260 F. 2d 958 (1st Cir. 1958) (affirming that the imposition on
plaintiffs of a five-cent charge per package of produce sold through auction service did not
constitute a restraint of trade and had not tended to suppress competition). See also Earl E.
Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-on Defense: The Hanover Shoe
Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1194–96 (1968) (listing a number of “passing-on”
cases that appeared before several circuit courts prior to Hanover).
38. Keogh v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (holding that the
damages alleged by the plaintiffs are conjecture and purely speculative).
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 165.
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machinery, alleging that United Shoe monopolized the shoe machinery
industry through its practice of solely leasing — but refusing to sell — its
shoemaking machinery.41 The Court held that United Shoe was in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. United Shoe had maintained that it should
be permitted to show that Hanover Shoe was not actually injured because it
had ultimately “passed on” the costs of the injury downstream to consumers
of their product.42 The Court, however, found that defendants in antitrust
cases cannot reduce their liability by showing that the plaintiffs had not
absorbed the entire overcharge.43 The Court reasoned that it would be too
difficult to isolate the extent that an overcharge had been passed on to the
purchasers further along the stream of commerce.44 Furthermore, the Court
held that buyers are equally entitled to damages, even if they raise the price
for their own product, because at whatever price the buyers ultimately sell
their product, the price they pay the seller remains illegally high, and their
profits would be greater were their costs lower.45 Importantly, another reason
for barring the “pass-on” defense was the Court’s concern that antitrust
violators “would retain the fruits of their illegality” if direct purchasers could
not sue for the entirety of the harm, including the portion of the overcharge
arguably passed on to indirect purchasers, because indirect purchasers
“would have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit,” and therefore presumably little
incentive to sue.46
B. Illinois Brick – Antitrust Standing and the Genesis of the Indirect
Purchaser Rule
Less than a decade later, the Court rendered its decision in Illinois
Brick, a case which in many respects paralleled Hanover Shoe. In Illinois
Brick, the State of Illinois and other local governmental entities in Illinois
brought a suit against eleven concrete block manufacturers alleging that they
had engaged in a price fixing conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.47 The manufacturers sold bricks to masonry contractors, who
41. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 482 (1968).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 494.
44. Id. at 493–94.
45. Id. at 489; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the
Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979) (arguing that Hanover Shoe would
strengthen antitrust enforcement by increasing direct purchasers’ incentive to sue because
they would capture the entire overcharge in a successful suit).
46. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S at 494.
47. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1977); see Sherman Act, 15
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then submitted bids to general contractors for specific portions of larger
construction projects.48 The State of Illinois and local government entities
subsequently awarded construction projects to general contractors who
accepted bids from masonry contractors using bricks purchased from the
manufacturers.49 Accordingly, the plaintiff government entities were three
levels removed from the defendant manufacturers. The Court considered
whether a plaintiff can sue for damages “in the context . . . in which the
plaintiff, an indirect purchaser, seeks to show its injury by establishing pass-
on by the direct purchaser. . . .”50 The majority ultimately held they could
not sue for damages due to the risks of duplicative recovery and the difficulty
of trying to apportion damages among the purchasers in the stream of
commerce.51
Prior to deciding the case before it on the merits, the Court explicitly
assented to establishing a rule of symmetry, stating that whatever rule it
adopts regarding “passed on” damages, must be applied equally to plaintiffs
and defendants.52 Given this constraint, the majority had only two options
— either overrule Hanover Shoe or apply it offensively.53 The Court chose
the latter route. In doing so, the majority opinion reexamined Hanover Shoe
and reaffirmed it,54 reasoning that in order to deter antitrust violators without
diluting the effectiveness of the antitrust laws, the recovery for improper
overcharges must be concentrated with the direct purchasers.55 The majority
drove this point home by stating: “However appealing this attempt to allocate
U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
48. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720 (“[T]he State of Illinois and 700 local governmental
entities, brought this antitrust treble-damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act alleging that
petitioners, concrete block manufacturers (which sell to masonry contractors, which in turn
sell to general contractors, from which respondents purchase the block in the form of masonry
structures) had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 726.
51. Id. at 721.
52. Id. at 726 (“[H]aving decided that, in general, a pass-on theory may not be used
defensively by an antitrust violator against a direct purchaser plaintiff, we must now decide
whether that theory may be used offensively by an indirect purchaser plaintiff against an
alleged violator.”) and 728 (“[W]e conclude that, whatever rule is to be adopted regarding
pass-on in antitrust damages actions, it must apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants.”).
53. Id. at 729 (“[B]ecause Hanover Shoe would bar petitioners from using respondents’
pass-on theory as a defense to a treble-damages suit by the direct purchasers (the masonry
contractors), we are faced with the choice of overruling (or narrowly limiting) Hanover
Shoe or of applying it to bar respondents’ attempt to use this pass-on theory offensively.”).
54. Id. at 735.
55. Id. at 734–35.
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the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of
complexity to treble-damages suits, and seriously undermine their
effectiveness.”56
In their dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Marshall, rejected the majority’s reasoning because, according to them,
consumers further downstream, i.e., indirect purchasers, would ultimately
bear the brunt of any injury stemming from an antitrust violation with no
feasible path to relief. Justice Brennan maintained that this was clearly not
the intention of the drafters of Section 4.57
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority’s focus on the
deterrence aspect of the antitrust laws and instead insisted that the main
intention of the Clayton Act was to ensure disgorgement of overcharges and
compensation to the injured.58 Furthermore, unlike the majority, the
dissenters did not believe that apportioning damages among direct and
indirect purchasers was any more difficult than the apportioning of damages
for other antitrust issues.59 Justice Blackmun penned a separate dissent in
which he opined that had Illinois Brick preceded Hanover Shoe, the Court
would have granted standing to indirect purchasers,60 a notion which some
antitrust scholars agree with.61
In the annals of Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence, Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brickwill forever be inextricably linked; it seems relatively clear
that the emergence of the eponymous Illinois Brick doctrine can be attributed
to what Justice Blackmun appropriately termed an “unhappy chronology.”62
56. Id. at 737.
57. Id. at 749.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 759–60; see alsoAMCReport, supra note 30, at 268 (noting that the “dissenters
were not persuaded that the complexity of assessing and allocating damages for both direct
and indirect purchasers was any greater than the complexity of other antitrust issues”).
60. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (“If Hanover Shoe had not preceded this case, and were
it not ‘on the books,’ I am positive that the Court today would be affirming, perhaps
unanimously, the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and
all the signs point in that direction, and a conclusion in favor of indirect purchasers who could
demonstrate injury would almost be compelled.”) (citation omitted).
61. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in
Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1999) (arguing that had
Illinois Brick followed several more recent antitrust decisions it would have been
“unnecessary”); see, e.g., AMC Report, supra note 30, at 438 (separate statement of
Commissioner Donald G. Kempf, Jr.) (“I’ve always thought that the strange twin rulings in
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick are explainable mainly by the order in which they arrived at
the Supreme Court. Had Illinois Brick been the first case, I can’t imagine that the Court would
have held that persons clearly injured by an antitrust violation could not recover.”).
62. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (“I add these few sentences only to say that I think the
plaintiffs-respondents in this case, which they now have lost, are the victims of an unhappy
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Indeed, in their attempt to safeguard stare decisis and fidelity to the texts of
Hanover Shoe and the Sherman Act, the Illinois Brick majority left within
its wake a difficult to apply rule that has spawned a labyrinthine stratification
of antitrust jurisprudence across both state and federal courts.
C. Cases and Statutory Responses to the Illinois Brick Ruling
While the Illinois Brick decision was derided by many academics and
practitioners alike,63 it has been applied by the Supreme Court a number of
times in the four decades since. The doctrine was first revisited again by the
Court in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready.64 InMcCready, an employee
(“McCready”) was provided coverage under a prepaid group health plan
purchased by her employer from Blue Shield of Virginia (“Blue Shield”).65
The plan provided reimbursement for part of the cost incurred by subscribers
for outpatient treatment, including psychotherapy. However, Blue Shield’s
practice was to reimburse subscribers for services provided by psychiatrists,
but not by psychologists, unless the treatment was supervised by and billed
through a physician. McCready was treated by a clinical psychologist and
submitted claims to Blue Shield for the costs of the treatment. After the
claims were routinely denied because they had not been billed through a
physician, McCready brought a class action alleging that Blue Shield and the
Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia, Inc., had engaged in an unlawful
conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to exclude
psychologists from receiving compensation under Blue Shield’s plans.66
McCready further alleged that Blue Shield’s failure to reimburse her was in
furtherance of the conspiracy and had caused injury to her business or
property.67
chronology. If Hanover Shoe had not preceded this case, and were it not ‘on the books,’ I am
positive that the Court today would be affirming, perhaps unanimously, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.”) (citation omitted).
63. The decision immediately caused Congress to create a taskforce to analyze and
evaluate alternatives to Illinois Brick. See Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray,
Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 69, 83 (2007) (noting that “critics outside the Court have remained vocal and
resolute, doggedly reciting the rule’s many significant shortcomings and determinedly
assembling a legitimate case for reform”).
64. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
65. Id. at 465–67.
66. Id. at 469–70.
67. For such an injury, McCready claimed that she was entitled to treble damages under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss,
holding that McCready had no standing under Section 4 to maintain her suit. SeeMcCready
v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 649 F.2d 228, 229 (4th Cir. 1981) (discussing the unreported
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In the majority opinion, in which he was joined by the two other Illinois
Brick dissenters, Justice Brennan placed a limit on the application of the
Indirect Purchaser Rule. The majority granted standing to McCready,
although a strict reading of Illinois Brick would certainly have relegated her
to indirect purchaser status.68 The Court reasoned that Illinois Brick sought
to prevent duplicative recovery by allowing both direct and indirect
purchasers to claim damages and recover from a defendant’s single
overcharge.69 Given this reading of Illinois Brick, the McCready majority
held that there was no prospect of a duplicative recovery.70 McCready,
however, seems to have been an anomaly, and the limited reading of Illinois
Brick applied in McCready soon made way for a stricter bright-line rule in
subsequent Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence.
The Court revisited the Illinois Brick decision less than a decade after
McCready. In Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, an investor-owned public utility
operating in Kansas and Western Missouri purchased natural gas from a
pipeline company for its own use and for resale to its commercial and
residential customers.71 Together with a second utility and several other gas
purchasers, it sued the pipeline company and five gas production alleging
they had conspired to inflate the price of gas paid by the utilities. The
plaintiffs sought treble-damages, pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
for both the amount overcharged by the pipeline company and the decrease
in sales to their customers caused by the overcharge.72
The states of Kansas and Missouri initiated separate Section 4 actions
against the same defendants for the alleged antitrust violation. Acting
as parens patriae, they asserted claims on behalf of residents of Kansas and
Missouri who had purchased gas from any utility at inflated prices.73
Although the utilities passed the overcharge from natural gas suppliers on to
consumers, the Court denied standing to the consumers, stating “that a
departure from the direct purchaser rule may be necessary when an indirect
district court opinion, which was overturned by the Fourth Circuit).
68. See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect
purchasers were not injured by the antitrust violation and therefore may not sue for damages).
69. McCready, 457 U.S. at 474.
70. Id. at 475 (“But permitting respondent to proceed in the circumstances of this case
offers not the slightest possibility of a duplicative exaction from petitioners. McCready has
paid her psychologist’s bills; her injury consists of Blue Shield’s failure to pay her. Her
psychologist can link no claim of injury to himself arising from his treatment of McCready;
he has been fully paid for his service and has not been injured by Blue Shield’s refusal to
reimburse her for the cost of his services.”).
71. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, 497 U.S. 199, 199–200 (1990).
72. Id. at 199–203.
73. Id. at 199.
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purchaser buys under a pre-existing cost-plus contract does not justify an
exception in this case.”74 Departing from the more flexible approach adopted
in McCready, the Court has employed the Utilicorps majority’s reasoning
when assessing antitrust cases in which Illinois Brick is implicated.75
In the decades since the genesis of the Illinois Brick doctrine, there has
been a considerable amount of debate surrounding its implementation and
future.76 Most importantly, in the wake of Illinois Brick, beginning with
California in 1978,77 over 30 states78 and the District of Columbia enacted
what are colloquially known as “repealers” that permit indirect purchasers to
pursue antitrust claims under state law.79
With the enactment of repealer statutes, antitrust litigation under these
statutes has become increasingly common. This has led to a bifurcated
74. Id. at 217.
75. The dissent criticized the rule as “rigid” stating that: “None of the concerns that
caused us to bar the indirect purchaser’s suit in Illinois Brick exist in this case.” Id. at 225.
The survival of the Illinois Brick doctrine is due mainly to what can be described as a perfect
storm of confluence and chronology that has left in its wake “an inflexible and sweeping
categorical rule that is in tension with the tenor of modern antitrust law.” Richman &Murray,
supra note 63, at 83.
76. See Robert G. Harris and Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly
Overcharge: A Response to Landes and Posner, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1280 (1979-1980)
(arguing that Congress should pass legislation to overrule Illinois Brick in the interest of
deterring cartelization and monopolization as well as compensating the actual victims of the
antitrust violations); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois
Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1999) (maintaining
that the decision is obsolete); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration
and Illinois Brick, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2115 (2015) (contending that Illinois Brick should be
overruled); Kevin J. O’Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34
(2001) (asserting that the ability of indirect purchasers to seek remedies in state courts could
lead to a statutory change designed to coordinate direct and indirect purchaser litigation).
77. AMC Report, supra note 30, at 268.
78. Additionally, even some states that did not enact repealer statutes have allowed
indirect purchasers to pursue price fixing cases under their antitrust laws. See Daniel R.
Karon, Your Honor, Tear down That Illinois Brick Wall - The National Movement Toward
Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1351, 1363–1391 (2004) (identifying the states that do not possess repealer statutes, yet still
permit indirect purchasers to pursue price-fixing claims).
79. AMC Report, supra note 30, at 268. In California v. ARC America Corp., the
Supreme Court held that these state repealer statutes are valid and not preempted by federal
law. 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989). While claims brought under repealer statutes were originally
litigated primarily in state courts, after the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act
(“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453, 1711–
15 (2012)), such claims are now litigated predominately in federal court. Stephen Carr,
Reconsidering Indirect-Purchaser Class Actions, 67 Fla. L. Rev 913, 925 (2015) (observing
that since the enactment of CAFA “many state-law indirect-purchaser claims now end up in
federal court alongside direct-purchaser class actions”).
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system of antitrust enforcement wherein direct purchasers have traditionally
filed under federal antitrust law, and, conversely, indirect purchasers have
pursued their state antitrust claims under state law. In response to the
unintended reality of the stratification of antitrust claims, Congress
established the Antitrust Modernization Commission (“AMC”) to evaluate
and scrutinize the existing antitrust laws.80 In 2007, the AMC issued a report
criticizing Illinois Brick and concluded that direct and indirect purchaser
litigation would not only be more efficient, but also fairer, if it were to occur
in one federal court for all purposes rather than in different courts.81 In order
to facilitate this, the AMC Report recommended that Congress enact a
comprehensive statute that would essentially overrule Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe.
However, despite these recommendations and the mounting opposition
to Illinois Brick by those in academia as well as many within the business
community, the Supreme Court has yet to overrule Illinois Brick and there
has been no legislative fix. It is with this negative attitude toward Illinois
Brick lurking in the background that Apple v. Pepper appeared before the
Court.
IV. APPLE V. PEPPER: PATH TO SCOTUS
A. Definition of a Digital Marketplace
To understand Apple v. Pepper, one must first understand the basic
structure of the digital marketplace. A digital marketplace is an online
marketplace that facilitates transactions between sellers and consumers
through the medium of a third-party platform.82 Examples include popular
sites such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba, among others. An app store is a
sub-type of a digital marketplace. App stores typically take the form of
an online store, in which users can browse through different app categories,
view information about each app (such as reviews or ratings) and acquire the
app either for a fee or at no cost.83
80. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–273, 116 Stat.
1856 (2002).
81. AMC Report, supra note 30, at 270.
82. SeeRichard Kestenbaum,What Are Online Marketplaces andWhat Is Their Future?,
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardkestenbaum/2017/0
4/26/what-are-online-marketplaces-and-what-is-their-future/#9b8a30a3284b [https://perma.c
c/AP22-U24X] (defining online marketplace).
83. APPLEAPP STORE, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/categories/ [https://perma.c
c/TR8P-YYVL] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store?h
l=en_US [https://perma.cc/3RX4-6GXA] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); see Google Play Store,
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The operating system for apps available in the digital marketplace is
functionally a duopoly.84 The two dominant players are Apple and Google;
Apple customers (iPhone and Mac users) may download apps through
Apple’s App Store and Android users may download apps through the
Google Play store. While these two platforms may seem identical in terms
of functionality and purpose, there is one paramount difference – iPhone
users are precluded from downloading any app onto their phones other than
through the Apple App Store. In contrast, Android users may download apps
through other platforms.
In order to list apps for sale on the Apple App Store, third party
developers must enroll in the Apple Developer Program, the cost of which is
a $99 membership per year.85 Furthermore, while the developers may
determine the ultimate sales price of their respective app, Apple requires that
the sales price ends in ninety-nine cents.86 Additionally, developers must
agree to allow Apple to deduct a 30% commission fee from all app
purchases; Apple then remits the remaining 70% to the developers.87
Apple’s incarnation of an app store has allowed them to create a monopoly
for app distribution on all iOS devices, including iPhones and iPads.88
Moreover, it has been argued that the creation of this monopoly has forced
the developers to raise their prices, effectively passing on the cost of Apple’s
commission to consumers.89
ANDROIDCENTRAL (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.androidcentral.com/google-play-store/home
[https://perma.cc/M7FF-GPBA] (discussing the functionality of the google play store).
84. A duopoly is a type of oligopoly where two firms have dominant or exclusive control
over a market. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 724 (2001) (defining a duopoly as
“a market with only two competitors”).
85. Developer Support, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/support/purchase-activation
/ [https://perma.cc/AQS2-ZFSJ] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
86. Stephen Nellis, Developers Sue Apple Over App Store Practices, REUTERS (June 4,
2019, 11:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-antitrust/developers-sue-apple-o
ver-app-store-practices-idUSKCN1T5249 [https://perma.cc/QDF2-3KL3].
87. Principles and Practices, APPLEAPP STORE, https://www.apple.com/lae/ios/app-stor
e/principles-practices/ [https://perma.cc/XFR8-74HU] (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
88. Justice Sotomayor referred to this during oral arguments as a “closed loop” in which
“Apple took 30 percent from the customer – not from the developer.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 6–7, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204).
89. See Romm & Albergotti, supra note 9 (noting that “the 2011 lawsuit was led by
plaintiff Robert Pepper, who argued that consumers ultimately felt the brunt of Apple’s
policies because developers raised the prices of their apps to cover Apple’s commission”).
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B. In Re Apple & AT&T Anti-Trust Litigation – Apple I – Laying the
Groundwork for Apple v. Pepper
Shortly after the debut of the iPhone, a class of consumers filed suit in
the Northern District of California against both Apple and AT&T Mobility
(“AT&T”), formerly the exclusive seller of the iPhone.90 After several years
of litigation, the District Court compelled arbitration of claims against
AT&T pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act,91 and the District Court de-
certified the case from its class-action status.92 Although the Court de-
certified the class, this case, which is colloquially referred to as Apple I, laid
the groundwork for the suit that would eventually reach the Supreme Court.
In Apple I, the plaintiffs alleged that Apple violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act through their monopolization, as well as attempted
monopolization of the aftermarket for iPhone applications.93 Additionally,
the plaintiffs alleged that both Apple and AT&T violated Section 2 through
their congruous monopolization and attempted monopolization of the
aftermarket for iPhone voice and data services, as well conspiracy to
monopolize said aftermarket.94
The Apple I plaintiffs alleged that prior to the launch of the iPhone on
or about June 29, 2007, Apple entered into a five-year contract with AT&T,
under which AT&T would be the exclusive provider of cell phone voice and
data services for iPhone customers through 2012.95 In effect, the undisclosed
five-year exclusivity agreement locked iPhone users into using AT&T for
five years, contrary to the users’ contractual expectations.96 The plaintiffs
also alleged that Apple required software manufacturers to share 30% of the
manufacturers’ revenues from the sale of iPhone apps in order to sell iPhone
apps on the App Store.97 In addition to technological features that prevented
iPhone consumers from downloading apps from anywhere but the App Store,
90. See In re Apple & AT&T Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-5152 JW, 2008 WL 2323762
(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008) (alleging various violations of federal antitrust laws and other
consumer protection laws arising from an arrangement between seller and service provider
upon the introduction of the device to the market).
91. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Arbitration Act).
92. See In re Apple & AT&T Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (granting AT&T and Apple’s motions to compel arbitration and to decertify class).
93. In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (“[D]efendants did not disclose to them the existence of the five-year exclusivity
provision in the Agreement, or that Plaintiffs would be locked into using ATTM after the
expiration of their initial two-year service contracts.”).
94. Id. at 1295.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1296.
97. Id. at 1295.
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Apple allegedly discouraged iPhone customers from downloading
competing third-party application software by refusing to honor warranties
if customers downloaded competing applications.98
Apple sought dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had
“neither alleged legally cognizable markets under the Sherman Act, nor
legally sufficient monopolization of those markets.”99 Judge Ware of the
Northern District of California held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
relevant aftermarkets, market power, and monopolization for voice and data
services as well as the applications aftermarkets to state a claim.100 Judge
Ware also denied AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration.101 In a subsequent
order, the District Court granted class certification to “all persons who
purchased or acquired an iPhone in the United States and entered into a two-
year agreement with Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC for iPhone voice and
data service any time from June 29, 2007, to the present.”102 However,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion,103 the District Court
de-certified the class.104
C. In Re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation – Apple II
Shortly after the decertification of the class in Apple I, a new suit was
commenced by iPhone users (Apple II).105 The new complaint was nearly
identical to the Apple I complaint; however, the Apple II plaintiffs filed
solely against Apple and did not name AT&T as a defendant.106 The
Plaintiffs alleged only one claim for unlawful monopolization of an
aftermarket for iPhone applications in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act and a second claim for attempted monopolization of the same
aftermarket.107 Concerning the alleged aftermarket, the Plaintiffs contended
98. Id.
99. In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig. at 1301 (quoting Apple’s motion at 1–2).
100. Id. at 1304–06.
101. Id. at 1299.
102. Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re Apple
iPhone Antitrust Litigation, No. 07-05152 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010), ECF No. 240-1.
103. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
104. In re Apple & AT&T Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(granting AT&T and Apple’s motions to compel arbitration and to decertify class).
105. Second Amended Complaint, In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, No. 11-07614,
2013 WL 6387366 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013) (stating that the named Plaintiffs filed
individually and on behalf of a class of “[a]ll persons in the United States . . . who purchased
an iPhone application or application license from Apple for use on an iPhone at any time from
December 29, 2007 through the present”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 4.
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that Apple has instituted, first, “an anticompetitive scheme to monopolize
the aftermarket for iPhone applications in order to control and derive
supracompetitive profits from the distribution of iPhone apps worldwide.”108
Second, Plaintiffs claimed that in implementing a closed iPhone operating
system, known as an “iOS,” the App Store is the only store in the world for
iPhone users to buy Apps for their iPhones. Thus, Apple “cornered 100% of
the worldwide distribution market for iPhone applications” and effectively
foreclosed iPhone customers from buying applications from any source other
than Apple.109
While the Plaintiffs conceded that the majority of apps available for
download on the App Store are free of charge, they alleged that, for paid
apps, “iPhone consumers have been overcharged hundreds of millions of
dollars.”110 Like Apple I, the plaintiffs also alleged that Apple receives a
“30% commission off the top and then remits the balance, or 70% of the
purchase price, to the developer.”111 Apple then sells or licenses the apps
directly to the consumer and collects the entirety of the purchase price and
only pays the developers after the sale.112 At no time during the transaction
do the app developers directly sell or license the apps to iPhone customers
or collect payments directly from the customers.113 Rather, Apple sells the
apps directly to its iPhone users. The Plaintiffs alleged that they were injured
by Apple’s conduct because they paid more for apps than they would have
in a competitive market.114 Additionally, the Plaintiffs maintain that, given
the structure of Apple’s App Store, they were deprived of freedom of choice
– choosing between the App Store and lower cost market alternatives – as
well as injured by a reduction in the output and supply of iPhone apps, which
would have been more abundantly available in a competitive market if not
for Apple’s monopoly pricing.115
The District Court, in an unusual application of the Illinois Brick
doctrine, ruled that the 30% commission deducted by Apple is not a fixed
fee, but a cost passed-on to consumers by the independent software
developers.116 As such, the District Court held that any injury to Plaintiffs is
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id. at 1, 4.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 9–10.
116. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (“[T]he Court finds that the 30% figure for which Plaintiffs
complain is not a fixed fee, but a cost passed-on to consumers by independent software
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indirect, resulting from the software developers’ own costs.117 Given that it
found that none of the exceptions to the Illinois Brick118 doctrine applied, the
District Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing as indirect purchasers
and granted Apple’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.119
D. Apple II Before the Ninth Circuit and the Resulting Circuit Split
The plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s Apple II ruling to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.120 The Ninth Circuit framed the issue as whether
the plaintiffs purchased their apps directly from the app developers or
directly from Apple.121 The Ninth Circuit applied Illinois Brick and the
Indirect Purchaser Rule in what it termed a “bright line” fashion, similar to
what it had done in the previous case of Delaware Valley Surgical Supply,
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson.122 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that one of
the plaintiffs, a hospital in the market for medical supplies, “which purchased
its [Johnson & Johnson] products through a separate contract with a third-
party distributor” was an indirect purchaser of J&J.123
Apple argued that a bright line reading of Illinois Brick warranted the
court holding that the plaintiffs be considered indirect purchasers. Thus,
according to Apple, it does not sell apps but rather sells “software
distribution services to developers.”124 In Apple’s view, because it sells
distribution services to app developers, it cannot simultaneously be a
distributor of apps to app purchasers, and the plaintiffs therefore lack
standing to sue.125 The Ninth circuit, while not opining as to whether Apple
developers. As such, any injury to Plaintiffs is an indirect effect resulting from the software
developers’ own costs.”), rev’d and remanded, 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017).
117. Id.
118. The District Court looked to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the meaning of price
fixing as applied in Illinois Brick in In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation. The District Court
found that under In re ATM Fee, Apple’s conduct did not amount to price fixing. Id.; see also
In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C 04-02676 CRB, 2010 WL 3701912 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
16, 2010) (holding that price paid by plaintiffs must be the price set and not merely “fixed”
in some broad sense for plaintiffs to be a direct purchaser under the narrowly defined injury
requirement of Section 4 of the Clayton Act).
119. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6253147, at *7.
120. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017).
121. Id. at 322.
122. Del. Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that the hospital that contracted separately with the distributor for sale and
delivery of medical supplies from the manufacturer was not a direct purchaser pursuant to the
direct purchaser rule).
123. Id. at 1118, 1125.
124. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 323.
125. Id. at 323.
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sells distribution services within the meaning of Illinois Brick, disagreed
with Apple’s characterization and held that the plaintiffs do have standing.126
The court’s analysis rested on the difference between a
manufacturer/producer on the one hand and a distributor on the other. The
Ninth Circuit considered Apple to be the distributor of iPhone apps, having
sold the apps directly to consumers through the App Store, and therefore
stated that Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and Delaware Valley compelled
them to grant standing to the plaintiffs.127
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling seemingly conflicted with an earlier Eighth
Circuit ruling in Campos v. Ticketmaster, which held that only concert
venues, but not concertgoers, had standing to sue Ticketmaster for their
inflated ticket prices.128 In Ticketmaster, the plaintiffs alleged that
Ticketmaster was a monopoly supplier of tickets to large-scale popular music
shows that possessed exclusive contracts with nearly every promoter within
the U.S.129 These exclusive contracts allegedly fostered an environment in
which Ticketmaster had a monopoly over ticketing for every large scale
concert and show within the U.S. and allowed it to handle the vast majority
of ticket sales regardless of whether Ticketmaster had an exclusive contract
with the venue or stadium hosting the concerts and shows.130 The Eight
Circuit held that the plaintiff concert and show goers lacked standing as the
concert promoters, who had agreed to sell tickets only through Ticketmaster,
were the direct purchasers of “ticket distribution services” from
Ticketmaster. Consequently, the ultimate buyers of tickets, the concert and
show goers who had no other relationship with Ticketmaster, were,
according to the Eighth Circuit, merely indirect purchasers. 131
As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp concludes, the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion produced a “perverse” result.132 According to the Ticketmaster
court, a buyer that is able to pass on all or part of the overcharge has standing
to sue as the direct purchaser.133 Yet, end of the line buyers who absorb all
of the overcharge are labeled as indirect purchasers and therefore lack
standing and are left without a remedy. Professor Hovenkamp’s analysis is
apt, and it is clear that the facts before both Circuits, at least superficially,
mirror one another. As in Pepper, the consumers in Ticketmaster transacted
126. Id. at 324.
127. Id. at 324–25.
128. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998).
129. Id. at 1168.
130. Id. at 1171.
131. Id.
132. Hovenkamp, supra note 36, at 18.
133. Hovenkamp, supra note 36, at 18.
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directly with the antitrust violator; however, the Eight Circuit’s reading of
Illinois Brick dictated that the consumers be considered indirect
purchasers.134 The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed, as what logically
results from it is that only venues may sue Ticketmaster, even if they have
passed on all their damages. Given that venues, many of which have
exclusive contracts with Ticketmaster, would certainly be hesitant to engage
in a legal battle with a ticketing giant such as Ticketmaster, it is unlikely that
concertgoers will ever receive a remedy. The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, correctly analyzed the Illinois Brick rule through a different lens, and
its holding resulted in a split between the two Circuits with regards to the
application of the Illinois Brick doctrine, particularly as it relates to
transactions conducted via a digital marketplace. This Circuit split was
brewing as Apple appealed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.135
V. APPLE V. PEPPER: BEFORE SCOTUS
A. The Conversation Surrounding Pepper
After the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, Apple sought certiorari, arguing that
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Indirect Purchaser Rule was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rulings inHanover, Illinois Brick, and
Utilicorp, even arguing that the Ninth Circuit had instituted a “new rule.”136
134. See Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d at 1171 (“The plaintiffs’ inability to obtain ticket delivery
services in a competitive market is simply the consequence of the antecedent inability of
venues to do so.”).
135. Professor Hovenkamp points out that the Pepper decision effectively overruled
Ticketmaster sub silentio as the majority propagated a categorical rule that the buyer who pays
directly to the defendant should be counted as the direct purchaser. Hovenkamp, supra note
36, at 18.
136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27-28, In Re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, 2017
WL 3393652 (U.S) (2017) (No. 17-204) (“In lieu of identifying pass-through damages and
the potential for duplicative recoveries, the Ninth Circuit would focus on ‘functions’ and
delivery. These concepts, however, find no support in this Court’s precedents. There
is nothing in Hannover Shoe, Illinois Brick, or UtiliCorp that so much as hints at this
approach. The Ninth Circuit tried to justify its new rule by pointing out that in this Court’s
leading cases ‘distributors’ were held to be direct purchasers from ‘manufacturers,’ and end
consumers were held to be direct purchasers from distributors or retailers.”). See also
Appellate Brief at 42, In Re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 3870180 (U.S.) (2018)
(No. 17-204) (“The contrast is stark. Under the Ninth Circuit’s new rule, so long as a
defendant ‘functions’ as a ‘distributor’ of goods to a plaintiff, that plaintiff is a ‘direct
purchaser’ from the defendant with standing to seek damages. The analysis is complete, and
it does not matter (i) whether ‘Apple does [or does] not take ownership of the apps,’ (ii)
whether Apple ‘mark[s] up’ the price of apps or takes a ‘commission,’ or (iii) ‘who determines
the ultimate price paid by the buyer of an iPhone app.’”).
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Interest in the case was strong. In terms of direct and indirect purchaser
jurisprudence, it had been nearly fifty years since Hanover, forty since
Illinois Brick, and thirty sinceUtilicorp. Additionally, this would be the first
Supreme Court case to address direct/indirect purchaser jurisprudence since
the 2007 AMC report recommended the reversal of Illinois Brick.
Significantly, the case would be an opportunity to learn where the newly
appointed Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh would come out on the issue.
Moreover, the Supreme Court would be able to address antitrust standing
principles in the context of a rapidly evolving digital economy that simply
did not exist when Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick were decided. The
excitement surrounding the case is evidenced by the number of amicus briefs
submitted to the Court. Of particular interest are the briefs submitted on
behalf of the U.S. government (DOJ and FTC), Chamber of Commerce, 31
states, and several prominent antitrust scholars.137
The government argued that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was contrary to
Supreme Court precedent and that the plaintiffs should be seen as indirect
purchasers because they purchased apps but not the app-distribution services
that Apple allegedly monopolized.138 This was an interesting argument from
the government, not only because of its reading of the Indirect Purchaser
Rule, but unlike Apple, the government conceded that the plaintiffs
purchased apps directly from Apple rather than from the app developers.
The Chamber of Commerce was also critical of the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling and argued in favor of the preservation of Illinois Brick, proclaiming
in apocalyptic terms that the ruling “threatens to severely distort the e-
commerce marketplace, where consumers spend trillions of dollars every
year. . . . Left in place, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will result in a cascade
of new antitrust cases, even in circumstances where no anticompetitive
conduct has occurred.”139 The Chamber of Commerce’s argument can be
viewed to a certain extent as a manifestation of a level of distrust by its
137. See Apple Inc., v. Pepper No. 17-204, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supre
mecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-204.html [https://per
ma.cc/UY8B-VQJH] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) for the amicus briefs.
138. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct.
1514 (2019) (No. 17-204), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-204/46060/201
80508135603183_17-204%20Apple%20v.%20Pepper%20%20-%20AC%20Pet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FC3D-NL3X] (noting that “the benefit that consumers derive from the allegedly
monopolized services is contingent on the independent decisions of app developers to utilize
those services to distribute apps that consumers find desirable (i.e., to make their apps
available in the App Store). This case is thus analogous to Hanover Shoe.”).
139. Brief of United States Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 1, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204), https://www.supre
mecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-204/59852/20180817125351471_Pepper%20Amicus%20Br
ief.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWE7-DG9Y].
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membership of the Courts’ ability, or lack thereof, to act as gatekeepers in
certain antitrust matters. Therefore, the Chamber argued that the Illinois
Brick doctrine in its current incarnation is a necessary barrier to prevent
certain consumers from being able to bring claims and to prevent courts from
making damages calculations that they are ill-equipped to make.140
There were also arguments made in favor of the plaintiffs, most
prominently by the 31 states that enacted repealer statutes.141 In their joint
brief, these states brought attention to the fact that, since Illinois Brick, state
courts have successfully overseen decades of indirect purchaser litigation.142
Directly challenging the Chamber’s outlook, the repealer states argued that
over the last four decades they have competently brought parens patraes
actions on behalf of their citizens and that state courts across the country
have shown themselves more than capable of applying gatekeeping rules to
proof of indirect purchaser damages.143 Furthermore, despite the disparate
state court systems, the repealer states argued that their successful litigation
of indirect purchaser claims demonstrated that the Illinois Brick majority
wrongly predicted that courts would be unable to calculate pass-on damages,
something which the Illinois Brick majority viewed as “virtually
unascertainable.”144
Additionally, over a dozen antitrust scholars submitted a brief in which
they similarly argued that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling should be affirmed, and
that courts and experts have shown themselves more than capable to assess
pass-on damages.145 The Scholars argued that while the state of econometric
methodology was “primitive” at the time of Illinois Brick, advances in
econometrics in the forty years since have turned a once difficult and
involved endeavor into a relatively straightforward process that allows
qualified experts to accurately calculate damages in complex antitrust
cases.146
All of the briefs seem to be iterations of the same two-sided argument
140. Id.
141. Brief for Texas, Iowa, and 29 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204), https://www.supre
mecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-204/65335/20181001143715665_17-204%20Amici%20Bri
ef.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB9A-7PYV].
142. Id. at 12.
143. Id.
144. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 725 (1977).
145. See Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Apple
Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204), https://www.supremecourt.gov/Docket
PDF/17/17-204/65336/20181001144219809_Apple%20v.%20Pepper%20-%20Brief%20of
%20Antitrust%20Scholars.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3HH-FCZD] (arguing that advances in
economic analysis havemitigatedmany of the concerns expressed by the Illinois BrickCourt).
146. Id. at 8.
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– namely, whether or not courts and experts are equipped to evaluate and
assess pass-on damages. It seems clear that in the four decades since Illinois
Brick, courts and experts have proven time and again that they are.
According to the Illinois Brick majority, the computation of passed-on
overcharges requires the assessment of demand and supply elasticities as
well as an assortment of complex variables influencing pricing decisions.147
However, according to Professors Hovenkamp and Areeda in their seminal
treatise Antitrust Law, “that is not the typical way in which passed-on
damages are computed in litigation.”148 Indeed, experts typically use the
generally accepted “yardstick”149 or “before-and-after”150 methods.151 Using
either of these methods allows for the computation of the price the plaintiff
would have paid but for the anticompetitive conduct “without reference to
the amount ‘passed on’ by the intermediary.”152
However, not addressed by the amici was the risk that, given the
proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers and
their across-the-board enforcement by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,
direct purchasers will have fewer opportunities to bring antitrust claims in
Federal Courts. As will be discussed further on this case note, given recent
Supreme Court precedent in cases such as Concepcion, Italian Colors, Epic,
and Lamps, in all likelihood, companies that employ these provisions will,
as Justice Ginsburg predicted, be “home free” and no longer subject to direct
purchaser claims.153 That would leave indirect purchasers (and regulators)
as the only viable antitrust plaintiffs – the exact opposite of the result
intended by Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.
B. Oral Argument
Oral argument in Apple II was heard on November 26th, 2018. Apple
argued that only the app developers have standing to sue and the plaintiffs
147. Id. at 27 (citing to Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741–43).
148. Id. (citing to 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
330b, at 219 (4th ed. 2014)).
149. The “yardstick” method compares prices paid by the plaintiff to prices paid by a
comparable firm unaffected by the antitrust violation. Id. at 383–84.
150. The “before-and-after” method compares the plaintiff’s prices paid before and after
the monopolization or price-fixing activity. Id. at 382–83.
151. See Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, Inc., 213 F.3d 198, 207 (5th Cir.
2000) (noting that “the two most common methods of quantifying antitrust damages are the
“before and after” and “yardstick” measures of lost profits”).
152. Brief of Antitrust Scholars, supra note 145, at 27–28 (citing to 2A PHILLIPE.AREEDA
&HERBERTHOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 346k, 220–21).
153. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-
204).
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are barred from doing so under Illinois Brick because the price set by the
developers is another step within the chain that links the buyers to Apple,
thereby making the plaintiffs indirect purchasers.154 Indeed, in an exchange
with Justice Sotomayor, who stated that the first sale is from Apple to the
customer, Apple’s counsel maintained that the initial transaction is between
Apple and the developer.155 The Solicitor General, Noel Francisco, argued
that the only reason consumers are harmed in the form of paying higher
prices is because the app makers decide to increase their prices in order to
recoup the commission paid to Apple. Accordingly, Francisco argued, the
app makers’ increase of prices, not Apple’s commission, is the proximate
cause of the injury to customers, and therefore plaintiffs are indirect
purchasers.156
The plaintiffs argued that the antitrust violation was the actual existence
of the Apple App Store in a “closed loop”, as Justice Sotomayor described
it.157 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that plaintiffs satisfied Illinois
Brick standing because Apple, by way of its express conduct, directed its
“monopoly abuses” at the plaintiffs.158 The plaintiffs further argued that
Apple’s position unnecessarily sought to expand and adjust the bright-line
rule established in Illinois Brick in order to deny direct purchasers in the
digital marketplace, such as the plaintiffs, a remedy.159
But it was Justice Ginsburg’s questioning of Apple’s counsel that
predicted the limited import of the Court’s decision regardless of how it
ruled. Rather than focus on antitrust standing under Illinois Brick, Justice
Ginsburg homed in on whether direct purchasers would ever be able to assert
a claim on a class basis in court given the Court’s recent jurisprudence
154. Id. at 3–4 (counsel for Apple arguing that “[t]he case is barred by the Court’s Illinois
Brick doctrine because the developers’ pricing decisions are necessarily in the causal chain
that links the commission to any consumer damages. If the commission increases beyond the
competitive level, but apps developers do not change their apps prices, consumers suffer no
damages. And if app developers do change their prices to pass on some or all of the over-
charge, well, that is precisely the kind of damages theory that the Illinois Brick doctrine
prohibits”).
155. Id. at 5.
156. Justice Kagan was very critical of this argument and stated that it was:
not [an] intuitive argument . . . it just seems to me that when you’re looking at
the relationship between the consumer and Apple, that there is only one step. I
mean, I pick up my iPhone. I go to Apple’s App Store. I pay Apple directly with
the credit card information that I’ve supplied to Apple. From – from my
perspective, I’ve just engaged in a one-step transaction with Apple.
Id. at 21.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id. at 33.
159. Id.
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governing arbitration clauses and class action waivers.
C. The Decision – The Kavanaugh Led Majority
In a 5-4 decision (surprisingly to many) penned by then newly
appointed Justice Kavanaugh, without ruling on any of the antitrust issues
involved on the merits, the majority affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding
strictly on the standing issue.160 The majority’s decision provides an
important insight into how the members of the Court read the Illinois Brick
decision as a so called “bright line rule.” The Court distinguished Apple II
from Illinois Brick by reasoning that iPhone owners are not consumers at the
bottom of a vertical distribution chain who are attempting to sue
manufacturers at the top of the chain.161 Rather, there is no intermediary in
the distribution chain between Apple and the consumer. The consumers, i.e.,
iPhone owners, purchase the apps from and pay the purported overcharge
directly to the alleged antitrust violator, Apple and the absence of an
intermediary is dispositive.162
The majority rejected Apple’s theory of the case, which maintained
that Illinois Brick stipulates that consumers may only sue the party who
ultimately sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the good or
service directly to the consumer.163 While Apple argued the app developers,
not Apple, set the retail price charged to consumers, thereby classifying the
consumers as indirect purchasers, the Court found three main problems with
this theory.164 First, that theory contradicts statutory text and precedent.165
The Court stated that any ambiguity regarding Illinois Brick should be
resolved by resorting to the statutory text, which provides that “any person”
injured by an antitrust violation may sue to recover damages.166 Moreover,
it should not be resolved through a rewriting of Illinois Brick and dismantling
of its bright-line rule.167 The second difficulty offered by the Court is that
Apple’s reading of Illinois Brick is not persuasive either economically or
legally.168 An Apple inspired reading would logically lead to the drawing of
an arbitrary line among retailers based on their financial arrangements with
160. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019).
161. Id. at 1521.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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their manufacturers or suppliers.169 Such a reading would therefore
permit a consumer to sue a monopolistic retailer when the retailer
set the retail price by marking up the price it had paid the
manufacturer or supplier . . . but not when the manufacturer or
supplier set the retail price and the retailer took a commission on
each sale.170
Last, if accepted, Apple’s theory would provide a roadmap for monopolistic
retailers to structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers in the
digital economy so as to entirely evade federal antitrust claims by consumers
and thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.171
Conversely, in ruling for the plaintiffs, the Court directly countered
Apple’s arguments that ruling in favor of the plaintiffs would undermine the
three rationales172 of Illinois Brick and proffered its own rationales for the
continued viability of Illinois Brick. One was the facilitation of more
effective enforcement of antitrust laws.173 The Court stated that Apple’s
reading of Illinois Brick makes little sense, because allowing only the
upstream app developers—and not the downstream consumers—to sue
Apple contradicts the longstanding goal of effective private enforcement and
consumer protection in antitrust cases. Second, while Apple argued that
calculating damages might be too complicated in cases involving
monopolistic retailers, the Court countered by stating that Illinois Brick is
not a “get-out-of-court-free card” for monopolistic retailers to play any time
that a damages calculation might involve convoluted or byzantine
computations.174 Lastly, the Court stated that Apple’s assertion that allowing
consumers to sue will result in “conflicting claims to a common fund—the
amount of the alleged overcharge” is patently untrue.175 If the Plaintiffs are
to prevail they will be entitled to the “full amount” of the unlawful
overcharge that they paid to Apple.176 Unlike Illinois Brick, the overcharge
has not been passed on at all, and therefore there will be no need to “trace
the effect of the overcharge through each step in the distribution chain.”177
Justice Kavanaugh ended the opinion by reiterating the goals of
169. Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
170. Id. at 1515.
171. Id. at 1521–24.
172. Id. at 1524 (listing the three reasons the Illinois Brick Court barred indirect purchaser
suits: “(1) facilitating more effective enforcement of antitrust laws; (2) avoiding complicated
damages calculations; and (3) eliminating duplicative damages against antitrust defendants”).
173. Id.
174. Apple, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1525.
177. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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antitrust law as a whole, stating:
Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and President
Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in 1890, “protecting
consumers from monopoly prices” has been “the central concern
of antitrust.” (citation omitted) The consumers here purchased
apps directly from Apple, and they allege that Apple used its
monopoly power over the retail apps market to charge higher-than-
competitive prices. Our decision in Illinois Brick does not bar the
consumers from suing Apple for Apple’s allegedly monopolistic
conduct. We affirm the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.178
In his dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices Alito,
Roberts, and Thomas, Justice Gorsuch vehemently protested the majority’s
reading of Illinois Brick. According to Justice Gorsuch, the majority erred
in allowing a “pass-on” case to proceed and in granting standing to indirect
purchasers despite Illinois Brick’s insistence that “these convoluted ‘pass on’
theories of damages violate traditional principles of proximate causation.”179
The dissenters insisted that Illinois Brick was just the other side of the same
proverbial Hanover Shoe coin. In Hanover an antitrust defendant could not
rely on a pass-on theory to avoid damages, while Illinois Brick addressed
whether an antitrust plaintiff could rely on a pass-on theory to recover
damages.180 However, while Justice Gorsuch and the other dissenters may
view the Hanover Shoe/Illinois Brick coin as one which is in mint condition
and the currency can clearly be delineated, it seems that based upon forty
plus years of direct and indirect purchaser jurisprudence that the coin is moss
covered and tarnished beyond recognition.
As Justice Kavanaugh adroitly stated, the phrase “‘[t]here’s an app for
that’ has become part of the 21st-century American lexicon.”181 Ultimately
the approach employed by the Pepper dissenters ignored the realities of the
digital marketplace as well as the function of the iPhone App Store in
particular. Conversely, the Pepper majority grasped on a fundamental level
that when a consumer purchases an app from the iPhone App Store, they
believe that they are directly transacting with Apple, not a third party.
178. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019).
179. Id. at 1525–26.
180. Id. at 1526–27.
181. Id. at 1518.
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VI. POSTAPPLE V. PEPPER
A. Implications of the Court’s Decision
After the Court granted standing to the Pepper plaintiffs, but did not
overrule Illinois Brick, scholars, pundits, lawyers, and interested observers
alike attempted to predict what would happen in Apple II upon remand, what
the Pepper decision means or should mean for the future of Illinois Brick182
and, most significantly, what the ruling portends for other tech giants who
operate and transact within the digital marketplace.183 There were those who
postulated that the Ninth Circuit would rule in Apple’s favor upon remand.184
Some thought it was likely that Apple would attempt to settle to mitigate any
further damage.185 And yet other observers opined that this would
completely change the way in which consumers purchase apps from within
a digital marketplace.186 While it remains to be seen which of the various
prognostications proffered will come to fruition, few, if any, opined that
182. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright,What’s Next in Apple Inc. v.
Pepper: The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and the Economics of Pass-Through, 2018 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 249 (2018-2019) (arguing that unless the plaintiffs expand upon their claim, it seems
unlikely that they will be able to prevail upon remand); Jeffrey L. Harrison, After Forty Years
of Antitrust Revision and Apple v. Pepper, What Now Illinois Brick? (July 1, 2019) (remarking
that Apple v. Pepper reveals a sharp division at the Supreme Court on the issue of what Illinois
Brick means, and that whatever role Illinois Brick may have ever played in rationalizing
antitrust law is now unneeded); Clayton Antitrust Act and Sherman Antitrust Act - Antitrust
Trade and Regulation - Antitrust Standing - Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 133 HARV. L. REV. 382
(2019) (stating that the ruling signals the unraveling of Illinois Brick).
183. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout, The Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine after
Ohio v. Amex and the Apple v. Pepper Decision That Should Have Been, 98 NEB. L. REV. 425,
454-459 (2019) (discussing the implications of the Pepper holding). See also Issie Lapowsky,
Supreme Court Deals Blow to Apple in Antitrust Case, WIRED (May 13, 2019, 1:04 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/supreme-court-apple-decision-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/B4L
W-4YWU] (expressing the reactions of those within the tech space to the Court’s ruling).
184. See generally Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 182, at 267 (suggesting that upon
remand the court will rule that the plaintiffs didn’t suffer competitive harm).
185. See Kif Leswing, Apple Failed to Close Off a Big Antitrust Threat, But It Probably
Won’t Feel the Harm for Years,CNBC (May 13, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/20
19/05/13/apple-v-pepper-supreme-court-loss-little-harm-now-long-term-threat.html [https://
perma.cc/L9QC-SN9V] (stating that Apple may look to settle given the inherent risks
allowing the case to move forward poses to its business).
186. See Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You
Buy Apps, THEVERGE (May 14, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/1861
8127/apple-pepper-supreme-court-loss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-ver
gecast [https://perma.cc/7QFM-VSQ6] (noting that “if the plaintiffs’ case holds up, it could
change the relationship between digital platforms and their users, giving customers the basic
right to sue tech platforms for violating antitrust law”).
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Pepper may have a limited application due to the prevalence of arbitration
clauses with class action waivers in the digital marketplace.
Yet, Justice Ginsburg more than hinted at that during oral argument in
a telling exchange with Apple’s counsel during rebuttal:
Ruth Bader Ginsburg:
Mr. Wall, I have a question about this Court’s case law, and I’d --
I’d like your answer to it. If Apple had in every agreement with an
iPhone owner a provision that you can sue -- you can’t sue, you
have to go to an arbitrable forum in a one-by-one, then Apple
would be home free in this case?
Daniel M. Wall:
We -- we do not have such a provision.
In fact, the -- all of the relevant agreements with both developers
and consumers state that -- that there shall be litigation in the
Northern District of California.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg:
Yeah, I -- I know -- I know you don’t, but suppose you did.
Daniel M. Wall:
If -- if that were the case, then this would be a matter for
arbitration, and I don’t think it changes the legal question.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg:
And -- and it would take this case out of this Court, put it in an
arbitrable forum, with a single complainant?
Daniel M. Wall:
Indeed, it -- it would, but that’s not this case.187
This brief discussion, seemingly a non-sequitur, did not really follow
from the previous line of questioning.188 However, to some Supreme Court
watchers, it was clear that Justice Ginsburg was voicing her concern about
the import of several very recent Supreme Court rulings, including
Concepcion, Epic and Lamps, which held that class-action waivers in
mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable.189
187. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63–64, Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No.
17-204).
188. Id.
189. When the Court initially decided Illinois Brick, the rule promulgated by the Second
Circuit in Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)
(prohibiting arbitration of antitrust claims) was in effect. However, what has come to be
colloquially known as the American Safety rule began to deteriorate after the Supreme Court’s
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While Pepper was closely watched for its implication on antitrust
standing for direct purchasers, and much has been written about its
application of Illinois Brick to a relatively new means of commerce, in
reality, given the Court’s ruling in Concepcion, Italian Colors, Epic, and
Lamps, Pepper is likely to have little precedential value and influence over
the development of federal antitrust law. Accordingly, Pepper’s implication
for antitrust standing – particularly for direct purchasers interacting with
large companies that dominate the digital marketplace –will be minimal. To
understand this, a brief discussion of the decisions in Concepcion, Italian
Colors, Epic, and Lamps and their effect upon the arbitration clauses of some
of the largest tech companies is warranted.
B. AT&T v. Concepcion, Italian Colors and Epic – Supreme Court
Jurisprudence on the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Over
the Last Decade
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).190
The FAA provides for the enforcement and legitimacy of arbitration
agreements and awards within the United States. Since its enactment, the
Supreme Court has ruled in a number of decisions that the FAA is to be
interpreted in a broad fashion as well as universally applied in both federal
and state courts.191 The question of whether the FAA preempts state law has
appeared before the Court a number of times since its enactment.192 This was
ruling in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(permitting international arbitration of antitrust claims). While the Court in Mitsubishi did
not overturn the American Safety rule, in 1994, the Ninth Circuit ended the continued
existence of the rule when it held thatMitsubishi effectively overruled “American Safety and
its progeny.” See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing
a domestic arbitration of an antitrust claim to proceed). Other Circuits have followed the
Ninth Circuit’s lead and have similarly allowed antitrust claims to be subjected to domestic
arbitration. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois
Brick, 100 IOWAL.REV. 2115, 2124 (2015) (“Other circuits followed suit and began to revisit
their rules against allowing domestic antitrust claims to be arbitrated, ultimately holding that,
despite the fact that Mitsubishi involved international arbitration, the opinion required that
domestic antitrust lawsuits be subject to arbitration.”).
190. 18 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
191. Id.; see also Claudia Salomon and Samuel de Villiers, The United States Federal
Arbitration Act: A Powerful Tool For Enforcing Arbitration Agreements And Arbitral
Awards, LATHAM&WATKINS (Apr. 17, 2014), https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/the-us-f
ed-arbitration-act [https://perma.cc/4SDH-9T73] (noting that “Supreme Court decisions over
the last several decades ensure that the FAA’s ‘pro-arbitration mandate’ must be broadly
interpreted and universally applied by both state and federal courts”).
192. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT 7–11 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44960.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y
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the question before the Court in Concepcion when it held that a mandatory
arbitration agreement with a class action waiver was enforceable despite
state law that provided otherwise.
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. A married couple,
the Concepcions, signed a two-year service contract with AT&T, and
believed that upon signing the contract, they would receive two free cell
phones. However, they were subsequently charged a $30.22 sales tax upon
the receipt of the phones. When the Concepcions signed their contract, it
provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties but required that
claims be brought by the parties on an individual basis and not as members
of a class. Nevertheless, the Concepcions sued AT&T in the Southern
District of California, alleging false advertising and that the contract was
inherently unconscionable in nature.193
The Southern District consolidated the Concepcions’ claim with
another pending class action suit against AT&T on the same issue.194 AT&T
filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration. Relying on the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,195 the District
Court denied the motion finding that the arbitration provision was
unconscionable because AT&T had not shown that individual arbitration
adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.196
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, also finding that the provision was
unconscionable under California law as announced in Discover Bank.197 It
also held that the Discover Bank rule198 was not preempted by the FAA
because that rule was simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis
applicable to contracts generally in California.”199
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
U59-WG6A] (discussing Supreme Court opinions that addressed the relationship between the
FAA and state law).
193. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011).
194. Id. at 337.
195. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (declaring Discover
Bank’s arbitration clause as unconscionable and against public policy).
196. The motion was denied sub nom., Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-01167,
2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008); affirmed sub nom., Laster v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009); cert. granted, 560 U.S. 923 (2010).
197. Laster, 584 F.3d 849.
198. The rule propagated by the Discover Bank court states that a class-action waiver will
be unenforceable under California law when it appears in a “consumer contract of adhesion,”
when the disputes “predictably involve small amounts of damages,” and where the plaintiff
alleges that “the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
199. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857.
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reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that California’s Discover Bank rule is
preempted by the FAA because it “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”200 Reminiscent of Hanover Shoe and Judge Posner’s statement
in Carnegie,201 the dissent, written by Justice Breyer, disagreed and
maintained that bringing claims on a class basis is appropriate where the
claim is for a relatively small amount asking: “What rational lawyer would
have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility
of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”202
Since its holding almost a decade ago, Concepcion has been much
maligned in academic literature and has even been described as a “tsunami
that is wiping out existing and potential consumer and employment class
actions”203 as well as “the real game-changer for class action litigation, as it
permits most of the companies that touch consumers . . . to place themselves
beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply incorporating class waiver
language into their standard-form contracts.”204 In the wake of Concepcion,
many companies either amended their arbitration clauses to add class-action
waivers or, if they had not employed arbitration clauses prior to the Court’s
ruling, adopted binding arbitration clauses with class action waivers.205
Since Concepcion, the Supreme Court has further expanded its
interpretation of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements with class action
200. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (citing to
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (determining that a state (Pennsylvania) law
stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congressional legislation)).
201. See supra note 20 (discussing Judge Posner’s thoughts on pursuing individual
arbitration claims).
202. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365.
203. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012).
204. Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to
Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), https://www.scotusblog.co
m/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights [http
s://perma.cc/62UY-2ATH].
205. Professor Gilles examined the language employed in the binding arbitration clauses
of thirty-seven companies across various industries. In addition to finding that nearly all of
these companies had amended their arbitration clauses in the wake of Concepcion, she also
found that all of the companies’ arbitration clauses contained class action waivers. This
displays a clear increase in the adoption of class action waivers compared to the decade prior
to the Court’s decision in Concepcion. For instance, Professor Gilles cites to a 2009 study
conducted by the Searle Institute, which found that 36.5% of arbitration clauses contain class
action waivers. In 2012, merely three years after Concepcion, all of the arbitration clauses
examined by Professor Gilles contained class action waivers. See Gilles, supra note 16, at
850–853.
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waivers beyond consumers to businesses and employees. In doing so, it has
narrowed access to the courts for potential plaintiffs who seek to vindicate
their rights. Three cases exemplify the Court’s approach, namely Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors,206 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis207 and Lamps
Plus, Inc. v. Varela.208
In 2013, two years after the Concepcion decision, the Court heard
Italian Colors. The question before the Court was whether a group of
merchants could sue American Express for violation of the antitrust laws.
The merchants maintained that, pursuant to the effective vindication
doctrine,209 they were exempt from the mandatory arbitration provision they
had signed with American Express, via their “Card Acceptance Agreement”,
given the prohibitively high cost of arbitration conducted on a non-class
basis. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the
prohibitively high cost of arbitration is not a sufficient reason for a court to
overrule an arbitration clause that forbids class action suits.210 According to
the majority, federal law does not guarantee that a claim will be resolved
affordably.211 The Court reasoned that, while it may be expensive to arbitrate
claims and prove a statutory remedy on an individual basis rather than on a
class basis, the clause is enforceable since the right to pursue a remedy was
not eliminated.212
Roughly a year before Pepper was argued, the Court decided Epic. In
Epic, the issue before the Court was whether the National Labor Relations
Act213 prohibits the enforcement of an agreement which not only requires
employees to resolve disputes with their employers through individual
arbitration under the FAA but also compels employees to waive their right
to participate in or receive benefit from any class, collective, or
representative proceedings.214 The Court ruled that the FAA “instructed
206. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
207. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
208. Lamp Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
209. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228. The Court relied on the Effective Vindication Doctrine,
which maintains that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985). See also Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 242 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“An arbitration
clause will not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights,
however it achieves that result.”).
210. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234–35.
211. Id. at 233.
212. Id. at 236.
213. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
214. See generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (holding that pursuant
to the FAA, arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitration are enforceable).
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federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,”215
and that the NLRA “does not mention class or collection action procedures”
and therefore, cannot be read to displace the FAA.216
In a scathing dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, referred to the majority’s decision as “egregiously
wrong.”217 Noting the extreme imbalance once prevalent in workplaces
across the nation and Congress’ attempts to rectify it through enactment of
the NLRA and the Noriss-LaGuardia Act,218 Justice Ginsburg stated that
when Congress passed laws it likely intended to protect employees’ joining
together to engage in collective litigation.219 Explicitly hindering the abilities
of employees to engage in class-based litigation and compelling them to sign
employment contracts that contain mandatory arbitration provisions is not
only unlawful under the NLRA,220 it would also signify that “[e]mployees’
rights to band together to meet their employers’ superior strength would be
worth precious little if employers could condition employment on workers
signing away those rights.”221
The final chapter in Justice Ginsburg’s battle against mandatory
arbitration clauses occurred during the same term that the Court heard and
decided Pepper. In Lamps, an employee of Lamps Plus Inc., Frank Varela,
sued his employer when it inadvertently released sensitive tax information
upon falling prey to a hacker. Although Varela had signed an arbitration
agreement with Lamps Plus Inc. upon commencing his employment, he filed
a class action on behalf of all of the employees who had their personal
information exposed by the data breach.
The District Court as well as the Ninth Circuit found that the language
contained within the contract was ambiguous as to whether or not a signer
was permitted to pursue class wide arbitration.222 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that under California law,223 an ambiguous contract is construed against the
215. Id. at 1619.
216. Id. at 1624.
217. Id. at 1633.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
219. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1641.
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (noting that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-
organization . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
221. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1641; see also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309
U.S. 350, 364 (1940) (holding that individual contracts obtained as the result of an unfair
labor practice may not be the basis of advantage to the violator of the Act nor of disadvantage
to employees).
222. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 2016 WL 9110161, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Varela v.
Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017).
223. Lamps, 701 F. App’x at 672; see Powerine Oil Co. v. Super. Ct., 118 P.3d 589, 598
(2005) (holding that a contract is ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions,
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drafter, and therefore “[t]he construction posited by Varela—that the
ambiguous Agreement permits class arbitration—the district court properly
found the necessary ‘contractual basis’ for agreement to class arbitration.”224
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that, pursuant to
Concepcion, state law is preempted by the FAA to the extent that it “stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives.”225 Furthermore, the Court concluded that courts evaluating
arbitration agreements may not extrapolate from an ambiguously worded
agreement that the parties have consented to arbitrate their claims on a class-
wide basis.
Justice Ginsburg, staying consistent and echoing the same sentiments
of her recent dissent in Epic, did not mince words when criticizing the
majority’s holding. Justice Ginsburg stated that the FAA was enacted “to
enable merchants of roughly equal bargaining power to enter into binding
agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes”226 not to regulate contracts in
which one party has significantly less bargaining power than the other.227
Justice Ginsburg ended her dissent by stating that “[n]otwithstanding recent
steps to counter the Court’s current jurisprudence, mandatory individual
arbitration continues to thwart ‘effective access to justice’ for those
encountering diverse violations of their legal rights.”228
It is clear that when Justice Ginsburg was questioning Apple’s counsel,
a mere six months after she rendered her dissent in Epic and only five weeks
after hearing the oral argument in Lamps, that her contempt for mandatory
arbitration clauses, which she would soon crystallize once again in her
dissent in Lamps, was on her mind. Aside from her criticism of the
possibility of forcing direct purchaser antitrust claimants into arbitration, the
irony that Justice Ginsburg was perhaps hinting at is that, if arbitration
clauses were enforceable, the pursuit of antitrust claims would be left solely
to indirect purchasers under state repealer statutes. Such a result would
entirely circumvent the reasoning of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
rejecting the pass-on defense and preserving such claims for direct
purchasers. Indirect purchasers would not be bound by arbitration clauses
with antitrust violators with whom they have no direct privity, but as the
both of which are reasonable).
224. Lamps, 701 F. App’x at 673.
225. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (citing to AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
226. Id. at 1420 (citing to Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1643 (2018)).
227. Id. (citing to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
228. Id. (citing to DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47 (2015) (resolving when
arbitration provisions are subject to the FAA)).
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Court inHanover Shoe presciently warned, antitrust violators will “retain the
fruits of their illegality” because no one will be able to bring suit against
them, either due to being barred from bringing suit or because they “would
have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit.”229
C. Survey of Companies’ Terms and Conditions in the Digital
Marketplace
As most companies that operate within a digital marketplace now
employ binding arbitration clauses that contain class action waivers agreed
to through the click of a mouse, it is very likely that the Court’s decision in
Pepper will be of little practical import for the future of direct purchaser
litigation. That is the salient point made by Justice Ginsburg in her exchange
with Apple’s counsel. Since most customers in the digital marketplace are
precluded from bringing antitrust (and all other) claims on either an
individual or class basis because they are bound by arbitration clauses, many
antitrust claimants will never see the inside of a courtroom. And, to quote
Justice Ginsburg, many of these companies that operate and conduct
transactions within a digital marketplace will be “home free,”230 while
companies such as Apple, who do not employ binding arbitration clauses
that contain class action waivers, are leaving themselves vulnerable to
potential litigation.
In order to demonstrate the above point, I have surveyed the terms of
use of some of the largest companies by market capitalization in order to
ascertain whether they contain binding arbitration provisions with class
action waivers, or whether they employ traditional venue provisions. I chose
229. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). In a
perceptive and forward-thinking article published in the Iowa Law Review, Professors Mark
A. Lemley and Christopher R. Leslie make a similar argument. See generally Mark A.
Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100 IOWA L. REV.
2115 (2015). They state that the use of mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers
is especially damaging to consumers who suffer antitrust injuries, as antitrust injuries impose
relatively low costs on a great number of victims. Id. at 2130–2131. Lemley and Leslie
contend that in the post Italian Colors world, class actions – which the Supreme Court has
recognized serve a valuable function in enforcing the antitrust laws – will no longer be brought
by direct purchasers. Id. at 2130. Consequently, Professors Lemley and Leslie believe that a
class of indirect purchasers will likely serve as “better” antitrust plaintiffs, as it is likely that
they will not be bound by arbitration clauses to the antitrust violator. Id. However, not all
indirect purchasers can or will bring claims, as they are limited to states that possess repealer
statutes and, as the Court has previously implied inHanover Shoe, have less incentive to bring
claims because of their “tiny stake.” Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
230. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-
204).
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a mix of companies, tech companies and companies that operate within a
digital marketplace, as well as non-tech companies who operate both within
as well as outside of a digital marketplace.
I examined the terms and service agreements of the following
companies: Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Alphabet (Google), JPMorgan
Chase, Johnson & Johnson, Visa, Walmart, Samsung Electronics, Intel,
Cisco Systems, ExxonMobil, Mastercard, Disney, Verizon, AT&T,
Comcast, Oracle, Netflix, Adobe Systems, and PayPal. I have included a
chart with the relevant language of each respective agreement.231
Regardless of the permutation of the language of the terms of use and
service agreements, out of the twenty-one companies selected, surprisingly
only twelve employ binding arbitration provisions and class action waivers.
The other nine have standard venue provisions. Out of the nine with standard
venue provisions, five232 had provisions limiting litigation to either Federal
or State Courts sitting in California, two233 had provisions limiting litigation
to either Federal or State Courts in New York, one234 had a provision limiting
to the state courts in Delaware, and one235 limiting litigation to the federal
courts in Virginia.236 For example, Apple’s venue provision is as follows:
Except to the extent expressly provided in the following
paragraph, this Agreement and the relationship between you and
Apple shall be governed by the laws of the State of California,
excluding its conflicts of law provisions. You and Apple agree to
submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
located within the county of Santa Clara, California, to resolve any
dispute or claim arising from this Agreement.237
Yet, Pepper will further incentivize companies that have not already
done so to amend their venue provisions to adopt binding arbitration and
class action waiver provisions. Arbitration is an opaque process that is a
black box to most consumers and greatly benefits sophisticated parties such
as large corporations like Apple. Furthermore, arbitrations are private affairs
that operate outside of the court system. Ordinarily, the only way to know if
a company arbitrated any dispute with a consumer is through court
231. See Appendix A (listing companies surveyed that possess binding arbitration clauses
as well as class action waivers within their terms of use/service).
232. Apple, Facebook, Google, Cisco, and Oracle.
233. Johnson & Johnson and Mastercard.
234. Intel.
235. ExxonMobil.
236. See Appendix B (listing companies surveyed that possess venue provisions).
237. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/i
nternet-services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/P7PD-WFBM] (last visited Nov. 29,
2020).
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proceedings seeking to enforce or challenge an arbitration award.238
Therefore, it is likely that savvy companies that currently employ venue
provisions in their terms and conditions will read the Pepper decision, see
the writing on the wall, and amend their terms and conditions to include a
mandatory arbitration provision containing a class action waiver to replace
their venue provisions.
In 2018, several academics at Stanford Business School sought to
discover whether companies have an informational advantage when
selecting arbitrators for consumer arbitrations, something which would only
further incentivize companies to employ binding arbitration provisions.239 In
conducting their study, the authors looked at data from over 9,000 securities
arbitrations240 and concluded that industry-friendly arbitrators are forty
percent more likely to be selected than their consumer-friendly counterparts.
The authors found that companies, as repeat and more sophisticated players
in this process, have an informational advantage over consumers when
selecting arbitrators.241 Given this fact, companies that find themselves the
respondents in arbitration claims, over time, have become better at
eliminating pro-consumer/anti-industry arbitrators and selecting arbitrators
who have proven sympathetic to them in the past. Professor Seru, one of the
authors of the study, states that:
This is a systematic problem. . . . If you look at the data across
many, many years, you see a pattern that is biased against
consumers and in favor of firms. It may or may not be intentional,
but given the design of the system and information available to
238. Arbitration has become relatively commonplace in the U.S. The arbitration process
is governed by an administrator/forum who determines the procedural rules. Administrators
often provide a list of potential arbitrators and govern the arbitrator selection process. One of
the unique features of arbitration is the amount of control that both consumer claimants and
firm respondents have over the process of selecting the respective arbitrator that will hear the
claim. For instance, in FINRA and JAMS arbitration, the administrator sends a list of
potential arbitrators to the claimant and respondent. Each party can remove/strike a fixed
number of arbitrators from the consideration set/list, and then must rank the remaining
arbitrators, assigning one to the most preferred arbitrator. The arbitrator with the lowest
combined (most preferred) rank is appointed as the arbitrator. SeeMark Egan, GregorMatvos
and Amit Seru, Arbitration With Uninformed Consumers (Harv. Bus. Sch. Fin., Working
Paper No. 19-046, 2020), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/arb
itration-uninformed-consumers [https://perma.cc/8WW8-SHUT] (examining the
informational advantage that firms have when engaging in arbitration).
239. Id. at 1–2.
240. In their paper, the authors assert that securities disputes present a good laboratory to
study arbitration in general because “the selection mechanism is similar to other major
arbitration forums; arbitration is mandatory for all disputes, eliminating selection concerns;
and the parties choose arbitrators from a randomly generated list.” Id. at 39.
241. Id. at 3.
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consumers and firms, it’s the outcome one ends up with.242
One potential way to counteract this is by hiring an experienced
arbitration attorney. However, this is a solution that can be afforded only by
a litigant with a large enough claim to support the cost or the proverbial
“zealot” who is willing to experience martyrdom and endure the tedious
arbitration process in order to merely stick it to the company with which they
may have a dispute.243 Another solution suggested by Seru is to have
customers who have the same grievance against a large company, band
together. That would incentivize arbitrators to have “more respect” for the
consumer side and potentially act as a countervailing force when they decide
how pro-business they wanted to be.244
However, given the existence of class action waivers that are often
employed by companies in conjunction with binding arbitration clauses, this
is not a practical solution. Take for example Walmart’s class action waiver:
YOU AGREE THAT ANY ARBITRATION WILL TAKE
PLACE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS . . . CLASS
ARBITRATIONS AND CLASS ACTIONS ARE NOT
PERMITTED AND YOU ARE AGREEING TO GIVE UP THE
ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION.245
Given the explicit and strong language present within this class action waiver
as well as many others that are more or less constructed in the same tone and
242. Edmund L. Andrews, Why the Binding Arbitration Game Is Rigged against
Customers, STAN. BUS. INSIGHTS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-
binding-arbitration-game-rigged-against-customers [https://perma.cc/LEQ3-NZDC].
243. Interestingly, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did propose a rule that
would have prevented financial companies from forcing consumers to sign mandatory
arbitration provisions in exchange for services. The proposed rule would have allowed
customers to enter class-action suits. However, Congress rejected the proposed rule in 2017.
Id.
244. Id. Recently, Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California rejected a
company’s attempt to circumvent its own mandatory arbitration clause in favor of using the
class action device to adjudicate claims of several thousand of its employees who had
commenced individual arbitrations. See Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062,
1067–68 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“The irony, in this case, is that the workers wish to enforce the
very provisions forced on them by seeking, even if by the thousands, individual arbitrations,
the remnant of procedural rights left to them. The employer here, DoorDash, faced with
having to actually honor its side of the bargain, now blanches at the cost of the filing fees it
agreed to pay in the arbitration clause. No doubt, DoorDash never expected that so many
would actually seek arbitration. Instead, in irony upon irony, DoorDash now wishes to resort
to a class-wide lawsuit, the very device it denied to the workers, to avoid its duty to arbitrate.
This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by this order.”).
245. Walmart Wellness Terms of Service, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com/help/arti
cle/walmart-wellness-terms-of-service/3afed3d0904a416d920ceb3527a9e4c9 [https://perma.
cc/3PF3-6QN6] (last visited Nov. 29, 2020).
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fashion as Walmart’s, it would not be possible for numerous consumers to
assert their respective claims on a class basis in an arbitration forum.246
As businesses and the law firms that advise them absorb the
ramifications of Pepper and consider the ruling along with other recent
Supreme Court decisions addressing antitrust standing as well as the
enforceability of arbitration provisions with class action waivers, they will
continue to adjust to the legal environment. In fact, in the wake of Pepper,
Apple has broken with its own past precedent and has implemented a binding
arbitration clause, as well as class action waiver, for one of its products. On
August 20th, 2019, three months after the Court’s decision in Pepper, Apple,
in conjunction with Goldman Sachs, launched its own credit card called the
Apple Card. Unlike Apple’s other products such as the app store, which
continues to employ a traditional venue provision, the Apple Card contains
an arbitration clause.247
VII. CONCLUSION
Pepper is the first Supreme Court case to address antitrust standing in
the context of the digital marketplace. Yet, at its core, the Court’s application
of Illinois Brick and the Indirect Purchaser Rule was in keeping with its
traditional analysis of only allowing direct purchasers to pursue federal
antitrust claims in federal court. Nevertheless, Pepper’s significance for
future antitrust claims arising from anti-competitive behavior in the digital
marketplace is likely to be diminished by the Court’s recent jurisprudence,
finding mandatory arbitration clauses with class actions waivers enforceable
across all industries and applicable to nearly every conceivable claim –
246. The enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions and class action waivers
continues to march forth unimpeded by the courts, Congress, or state legislatures. Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court in a recent landmark decision held that arbitration clauses in bylaws
or certificates of incorporation requiring shareholders to individually arbitrate federal
securities and other claims are enforceable. Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del.
2020).
247. The arbitration clause reads as follows:
YOU ARE GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE CLAIMS (AS DEFINED
BELOW) AND THE RIGHT TO INITIATE OR PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS
ACTION. You hereby knowingly and voluntarily WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BE
HEARD IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL on all Claims subject to this
Agreement. You further acknowledge that you have read this arbitration
provision carefully, agree to its terms, and are entering into this Agreement
voluntarily and not in reliance on any promises or representations whatsoever
except those contained in this Agreement.
GOLDMAN SACHS, PATH TOAPPLE CARD TERMS OFUSE 5, https://www.goldmansachs.com/te
rms-and-conditions/Path-to-Apple-Card-Terms-of-Use.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3AM-PTXS].
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including antitrust claims.
This result is clearly at variance with the original purpose of the Indirect
Purchaser Rule as made clear in Hanover Shoe. Justice Ginsburg more than
hinted at this perversion of the Court’s intent at oral argument; and perhaps
that is why the minority in Pepper went out of its way to find that the
plaintiffs in Pepper lacked direct purchaser standing. Regardless, without
congressional intervention or a drastic retreat by the Supreme Court from its
recent decisions applying the FAA in the broadest possible manner, plaintiffs
will continue to find their access to the courts and jury trials severely
restricted.
VIII. APPENDIXA
248. Microsoft License Terms,MICROSOFT, at §11 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Uset
erms/Retail/Windows/10/Useterms_Retail_Windows_10_EnglishGermany.htm [https://per
ma.cc/Z83J-KS2Z] (last updated June 2018).
249. Samsung+ and Samsung Members Terms of Service, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS, at
§10.2 https://www.samsung.com/us/samsungplus/terms/ [https://perma.cc/Z38C-T4QB] (last
updated Mar. 1, 2019).
Company Binding Arbitration Provision Class Action Waiver
Microsoft248 Binding Arbitration and Class
Action Waiver if You Live in (or, if
a Business, Your Principal Place of
Business is in) the United States . . .
you and we agree to binding
individual arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) under the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and not to
sue in court in front of a judge or jury.
Class action lawsuits, class-wide
arbitrations, private attorney-general
actions, and any other proceeding where
someone acts in a representative capacity
aren’t allowed. Nor is combining
individual proceedings without the
consent of all parties.
Samsung
Electronics249
By using the Samsung Services,
you unconditionally consent and
agree that: (i) any claim, dispute or
controversy . . . will be resolved
exclusively by final and binding
arbitration administered by JAMS
and conducted before a sole
arbitrator in accordance with the
rules of JAMS; (ii) this clause is
made pursuant to a transaction
[T]here shall be no authority for any
claims to be arbitrated on a class or
representative basis, arbitration can decide
only your and/or the applicable Samsung
Entity’s individual claims; the arbitrator
may not consolidate or join the claims of
other persons or parties who may be
similarly situated; and you will not file or
participate in a class action against us.
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250. Visa Solution Terms of Service, VISA, at §18(h)(1), https://usa.visa.com/legal/checko
ut/terms-of-service.html [https://perma.cc/HVK5-5ARA] (last updated Jan. 22, 2020).
251. Customer Agreement, VERIZON, https://www.gowireless.com/vz-customer-agreemen
t/ [https://perma.cc/M23B-WS8W] (last updated May 15, 2017).
252. AT&T Expressions End User License Agreement, AT&T, at §9.1.1, https://www.att.
com/legal/terms.expressions.html [https://perma.cc/3PWL-BWG2]
(last updated June 20, 2015).
involving interstate commerce, and
shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16;
Visa250 Any Disputes between you and
Visa shall be resolved through
binding arbitration; except that, if
you are a US resident, you may assert
claims in small claims court (if your
claims qualify).
ANY CLAIM SHALL BE
ARBITRATED ON AN INDIVIDUAL
BASIS. THIS MEANS THAT BOTH
YOU AND VISA ARE PROHIBITED
FROM JOINING OR
CONSOLIDATING CLAIMS IN
ARBITRATION BY OR AGAINST
OTHERS UNLESS BOTH YOU AND
VISA AGREE OTHERWISE IN
WRITING, AND YOU AND VISA ARE
PROHIBITED FROM ARBITRATING
ANY CLAIMS AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF
A CLASS. BY ENTERING INTO
THESE TERMS, YOU AND VISA ARE
EACH WAIVING THE RIGHT TO
PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION.
Verizon251 YOU AND VERIZON BOTH
AGREE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
ONLY BY ARBITRATION OR IN
SMALL CLAIMS COURT. YOU
UNDERSTAND THAT BY THIS
AGREEMENT YOU ARE GIVING
UP THE RIGHT TO BRING A
CLAIM IN COURT OR IN FRONT
OF A JURY.
THIS AGREEMENT DOESN’T
ALLOW CLASS OR COLLECTIVE
ARBITRATIONS EVEN IF THE AAA
OR BBB PROCEDURES OR RULES
WOULD . . . NO CLASS OR
REPRESENTATIVE OR PRIVATE
ATTORNEYGENERAL THEORIES OF
LIABILITY OR PRAYERS FOR
RELIEF MAY BE MAINTAINED IN
ANY ARBITRATION HELD UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT.
AT&T252 AT&T and you agree to
arbitrate all disputes and
You agree that, by entering into this
License, you and AT&T are ach waiving
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253. Comcast Website Terms of Service, COMCAST, https://www.xfinity.com/corporate/le
gal/visitoragreement?pc=1 [https://perma.cc/K7MZ-CLUV] (last updated Dec. 19, 2017).
254. Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX, at §7.1, https://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse
[https://perma.cc/556X-HKBB] (last updated Jan. 1, 2021).
claims between us. This agreement to
arbitrate is intended to be broadly
interpreted.
the right to a trial by jury or to participate
in a class action. This License evidences
a transaction in interstate commerce, and
thus the Federal Arbitration Act governs
the interpretation and enforcement of this
provision.
Comcast253 Any Dispute involving you and
us shall be resolved through
individual arbitration. In arbitration,
there is no judge or jury and there is
less discovery and appellate review
than in court.
THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR
AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO
BE ARBITRATED OR LITIGATED ON
A CLASS ACTION, JOINT OR
CONSOLIDATED BASIS OR ON
BASES INVOLVING CLAIMS
BROUGHT IN A PURPORTED
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON
BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
(SUCH AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS,
OR OTHER PERSONS. . . . THIS
WAIVER OF CLASS ACTIONS AND
COLLECTIVE RELIEF IS AN
ESSENTIAL PART OF THIS
ARBITRATION PROVISION AND
CANNOT BE SEVERED FROM IT.
Netflix254 You and Netflix agree that any
dispute, claim or controversy arising
out of or relating in any way to the
Netflix service, these Terms of Use
and this Arbitration Agreement, shall
be determined by binding arbitration
or in small claims court.
You agree that, by agreeing to these
Terms of Use, the U.S. Federal Arbitration
Act governs the interpretation and
enforcement of this provision, and that
you and Netflix are each waiving the right
to a trial by jury or to participate in a class
action. This arbitration provision shall
survive termination of this Agreement and
the termination of your Netflix
membership.
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Adobe255 If you have any concern or
dispute, you agree to first try to
resolve the dispute informally by
contacting us. If a dispute is not
resolved within 30 days of
submission, any resulting legal
actions must be resolved through
final and binding arbitration,
except that you may assert claims
in small claims court if your
claims qualify.
You may only resolve disputes with us
on an individual basis, and you may not
bring a claim as a plaintiff or a class
member in a class, consolidated, or
representative action.
Paypal256 You and PayPal each agree
that any and all disputes or
claims that have arisen or may
arise between you and PayPal,
shall be resolved exclusively
through final and binding
arbitration, rather than in court,
except that you may assert claims
in small claims court.
You and PayPal agree that each of us
may bring claims against the other only on
an individual basis and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class or
representative action or proceeding. Unless
both you and PayPal agree otherwise, the
arbitrator(s) may not consolidate or join
more than one person’s or party’s claims
and may not otherwise preside over any
form of a consolidated, representative or
class proceeding.
Disney257 the dispute shall be resolved
by binding arbitration before a
neutral arbitrator whose decision
will be final except for a limited
right of appeal under the U.S.
Federal Arbitration Act. YOU
ARE GIVING UP THE RIGHT
TO LITIGATE A DISPUTE IN
COURT BEFORE A JUDGE
OR JURY.
PROCEEDINGS TO RESOLVE OR
LITIGATE A DISPUTE IN ANY FORUM
WILL BE CONDUCTED ON AN
INDIVIDUAL BASIS. Neither you nor
Disney will seek to have a dispute heard as
a class action or private attorney general
action or in any other proceeding in which
either party acts or proposes to act in a
representative capacity.
Walmart258 EXCEPT FOR DISPUTES
THAT QUALIFY FOR SMALL
CLAIMS COURT, ALL
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF
OR RELATED TO THESE




YOU AGREE THAT ANY
ARBITRATIONWILL TAKE PLACE ON
AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS; CLASS
ARBITRATIONS AND CLASS
ACTIONS ARE NOT PERMITTED AND
YOUARE AGREEING TOGIVE UP THE
ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A
CLASS ACTION.
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255. Adobe General Terms of Use, ADOBE, at §14.1 and §14.3 https://www.adobe.com/l
egal/terms.html [https://perma.cc/YP8V-7CGD] (last updated Apr. 16, 2020).
256. PayPal Platform Seller Account Agreement, PAYPAL, at §11, https://www.paypal.co
m/us/webapps/mpp/ua/platform-seller-agreement [https://perma.cc/8VV5-EJKL] (last
updated Apr. 20, 2020).
257. English – Terms of Use – United States, DISNEY, at §8 and §8(B), https://disneyterm
sofuse.com/app/uploads/2020/10/Disney-US-English-Terms-of-Use-060920a-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B935-HMYD] (last updated June 9, 2020).
258. Terms of Use, WALMART, at §20, https://one.walmart.com/content/walmart_custome
r_spark_community/terms-of-use.html [https://perma.cc/MS9V-4UCZ] (last visited Jan. 18,
2021).
259. Online Service Agreement, JP MORGAN CHASE, at §12, https://www.chase.com/cont
ent/dam/mobile/en/legacy/documents/legal-docs/COLSA2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W86-7TA













THAT ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM
OR CONTROVERSY
ARISING NOW OR IN THE
FUTURE UNDER OR
RELATING IN ANY WAY TO
THIS AGREEMENT, OR TO
THE ONLINE SERVICE
(“CLAIM”), REGARDLESS OF






BE RESOLVED BY BINDING
ARBITRATION.
YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
BRING A CLASS ACTION OR OTHER
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION (SUCH AS
AN ACTION IN THE FORM OF A
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL) TO
LITIGATE ANY CLAIMS IN COURT
BEFORE EITHER A JUDGE OR JURY;
NOR WILL YOU BE ABLE TO
PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS MEMBER
IN A CLASS ACTION OR OTHER
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION IN
ARBITRATION OR IN COURT BEFORE
EITHER A JUDGE OR JURY.
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IX. APPENDIX B
Company Venue Provision
Apple260 [t]his Agreement and the relationship between you and Apple shall be
governed by the laws of the State of California, excluding its conflicts of law
provisions. You and Apple agree to submit to the personal and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts located within the county of Santa Clara, California, to
resolve any dispute or claim arising from this Agreement.
Facebook261 For any claim, cause of action, or dispute you have against us that arises
out of or relates to these Terms or the Facebook Products (“claim”), you agree
that it will be resolved exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California or a state court located in San Mateo County. You also
agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of either of these courts for the
purpose of litigating any such claim, and that the laws of the State of California
will govern these Terms and any claim, without regard to conflict of law
provisions.
Google262 California law will govern all disputes arising out of or relating to these
terms, service-specific additional terms, or any related services, regardless of
conflict of laws rules. These disputes will be resolved exclusively in the federal
or state courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA, and you and Google
consent to personal jurisdiction in those courts.
Cisco263 If there is any dispute relating to the Site or these Terms, you and Cisco
agree to exclusive personal jurisdiction and venue in the state and federal courts
of Santa Clara County, State of California, U.S.A.
Oracle264 All matters relating to your access to, and use of, the Site and Content
provided on or through or uploaded to the Site shall be governed by U.S. federal
law or the laws of the State of California. Any legal action or proceeding relating
to your access to, or use of, the Site or Content shall be instituted in a state or
federal court in San Francisco or Santa Clara County, California.
Johnson & All disputes between you and us arising out of or related to the Services or
this Agreement, whether based in contract, tort, statute, fraud, misrepresentation
260. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, at §G(i), https://www.apple.co
m/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/HK79-L4SD] (last updated
Sept. 16, 2020).
261. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, at §4(4), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https:/
/perma.cc/6P4C-ZMA4] (last updated Oct. 22, 2020).
262. GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en
-US%2014/18 [https://perma.cc/KUP4-Q669] (last updated Mar. 31, 2020).
263. Cisco Web Site Terms of Use, CISCO, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/legal/te
rms-conditions.html [https://perma.cc/J9JJ-HDE5] (last updated Sept. 7, 2018).
264. Terms of Notice, ORACLE, at §22, https://www.oracle.com/legal/terms.html [https:/
/perma.cc/5VXW-4SBV] (last updated Apr. 22, 2016).
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Johnson265 or any other legal theory and including non-contractual disputes or claims, will
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal and state courts located in
the State of New York, U.S.A., and you waive any jurisdictional, venue or
inconvenient forum objections to such courts.
Mastercard266 You expressly agree that any action at law or in equity arising out of or
directly or indirectly relating to these Terms of Use or this Site shall be filed
only in the federal or state courts sitting in New York. You hereby consent and
submit to personal jurisdiction of such courts for the purposes of any action
related to the Mastercard Site, your access or use thereof, or these Terms of Use,
and to extra-territorial service of process.
Intel267 The Terms and the relationship between you and Intel shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Delaware, USA without regard to its conflict of law
provisions and each party shall submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts located within the State.
ExxonMobil268 This Agreement shall be governed by the internal substantive laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, USA (without giving effect to its principles of
conflict of laws). Where federal jurisdiction exists over any action, suit or
proceeding arising out of or in any way connected with this Agreement, you and
ExxonMobil designate the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, Alexandria Division, for the exclusive resolution of that dispute and
submit to the jurisdiction of that court. Where federal jurisdiction does not exist
over that action, suit or proceeding, you and ExxonMobil designate the Circuit
Court for the County of Fairfax, Virginia, for the exclusive resolution of that
dispute and submit to the jurisdiction of that court.
265. Terms of Service, JOHNSON& JOHNSON, at §21, https://www.jnjvisionpro.com/legal-
notice [https://perma.cc/HQ4R-WAWY] (last updated July 18, 2019).
266. U.S. Terms of Service, MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/vision/who-
we-are/terms-of-use.html [https://perma.cc/VPR9-XWPY] (last visited Jan. 18, 2021).
267. Intel Terms of Use, INTEL, https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/legal/terms-of-
use.html [https://perma.cc/DBB4-YSJW] (last visited Jan 18, 2021).
268. Terms and Conditions, EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION, at §14, https://www.xtoenergy
.com/legal-pages/Terms-and-conditions [https://perma.cc/3N8K-KRAW] (last updated June
12, 2018).
